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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade or so, the Supreme Court has issued an
extraordinary and highly controversial series of decisions concerning the scope
of Congress’s power. Yet beneath the surface of the debate over the
federalism cases lies a parallel dispute that has received far less academic
notice. This dispute concerns the proper mode of judicial review in cases testing the
scope of congressional power. The uncertainty is greatest in the Commerce
Clause area, where the Court’s recent cases—including its 2005 decision in
Gonzales v. Raich—have shown a strong preference for facial challenges, in
sharp contrast to the Court’s traditional inclination toward as-applied review.
This article explores several possible rationales for the Court’s use of facial
review in Commerce Clause cases, and concludes that the soundest
explanation lies in an understanding of the Clause’s meaning that incorporates
a requirement of appropriate legislative purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
Facial challenges are in the news.
The foregoing sentence is, of course, an exaggeration. In truth, the
question of whether statutes ought to be challenged as unconstitutional on
their face or merely as applied to particular facts is one that only a lawyer could
love. The general public remains largely—and no doubt blissfully—unaware
of the question. Nevertheless, a series of high-profile events over the past year
has brought the issue of facial challenges back into prominence for judges and
scholars, across several domains of constitutional law. Consider:
Abortion rights. During the confirmation hearings of Justice Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., in January 2006, the nominee’s critics focused a great deal of
attention on his partial dissent in the Third Circuit’s 1991 Casey case, which
later became the Supreme Court’s 1992 Casey case.1 (They thought, probably
correctly, that Alito’s opinion indicated his general opposition to abortion
rights.) In that opinion, Judge Alito voted to uphold Pennsylvania’s spousal
notification statute. Noting that the plaintiffs had launched a facial challenge
against the statute, Judge Alito reasoned that “proof that the provision would
adversely affect an unknown number of women with a particular combination
of characteristics could not suffice” to demonstrate its unconstitutionality.2
The Supreme Court pointedly rejected Judge Alito’s reasoning on this issue.3
Later in January 2006, the Supreme Court directly confronted the question of
facial challenges in the abortion rights context.4 The First Circuit had facially
invalidated a New Hampshire parental notification statute because it did not
contain a health exception. In Sandra Day O’Connor’s valedictory opinion as
a justice, the Court unanimously remanded to allow the lower courts to fashion
a narrower remedy, and expressed a strong preference for as-applied rather
than facial invalidation. “Generally speaking,” said the Court, “when
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the

1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d
in part & rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2

Id. at 722 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting).

3

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992).

4

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
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problem.”5
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. In January 2006, in United
States v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act6 as applied to a disabled inmate in a state prison.7 In a brief
and unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court assumed that the
allegations in the inmate’s complaint were sufficient to state valid claims under
the Eighth Amendment, and held on that basis that Title II, as applied to those
allegations, was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling
followed a similar holding in the 2004 case of Tennessee v. Lane, which upheld
Title II as applied to the denial of the fundamental right of disabled individuals
to gain access to the courts.8 The Georgia and Lane decisions marked a
departure from a series of cases beginning in 1997 in which the Court
invalidated—apparently on their face—several federal statutes on the ground
that they exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
authority.9
Commerce Clause authority. During the confirmation hearings of Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., in September 2005, the nominee’s critics focused
a great deal of attention on then-Judge Roberts’s brief separate opinion in
what became widely known as the “hapless toad case.”10 (They thought,
probably incorrectly, that Judge Roberts’s opinion indicated he would vote to
5 Id. at 967. Distinguishing the 2000 case of Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000),
in which the Court struck down a Nebraska statute on its face for failure to include a health
exception, the Court noted simply that “the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and we did not
contemplate, relief more finely drawn.” Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 969. The following week, the
Court issued a similar opinion concerning campaign finance, remanding to allow the lower
courts to entertain an as-applied challenge to the McCain-Feingold statute. See Wisconsin
Right to Life v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006) (per curiam).
6

42 U. S. C. § 12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II 2002).

7

126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).

8

541 U.S. 509 (2004).

9 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001). But see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). The Court has also
expressed a reluctance to entertain facial challenges in cases challenging exercises of
Congress’s Spending Clause authority. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004);
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
10 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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strike down the Endangered Species Act as exceeding Congress’s Interstate
Commerce Clause power.) In that opinion, Judge Roberts construed the
Supreme Court’s precedents to mean that “a facial challenge can succeed only
if there are no circumstances in which the Act at issue can be applied without
violating the Commerce Clause.”11 Earlier in 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich,12 the
Court had upheld against Commerce Clause challenge the application of the
federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) to medicinal users of marijuana
within California who either cultivated their own cannabis or obtained it for
free from within the state.13 Although the Court itself characterized Raich as
an as-applied challenge, its reasoning and result strongly suggested that asapplied challenges under the Commerce Clause will not receive a friendly
reception at the Court. Indeed, Raich has already been described as putting an
end to the short-lived flowering of such challenges in the lower courts.14
This recent burst of attention to the issue of facial challenges will no
doubt spark discussion and debate among scholars and practitioners on a
number of fronts. But it is the Court’s Commerce Clause cases—and Raich in
particular—that stand out, because they pose several unanswered questions.
How can we explain the seemingly paradoxical fact that the Court’s earlier
decisions in United States v. Lopez15 and United States v. Morrison,16 which
vindicated facial challenges under the Commerce Clause, ended up unleashing
a torrent of as-applied challenges in the lower courts,17 while Raich, which dealt
with an as-applied challenge, ended up cementing the Court’s commitment to
facial review? Why do justices such as Antonin Scalia who oppose broad use
of facial challenges in cases involving individual rights appear to favor it in
cases involving congressional power, while justices such as John Paul Stevens
11

Id. at 1160.

12

125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).

13

Id.

See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five
Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 918 (2005) (“Whatever the effects of Raich on lower
courts … one thing is clear: the as-applied challenges to which lower courts had been warming
are likely over.”); Randy Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743
(2005).
14

15 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
16 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil remedy provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act as beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).

See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denning, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003) (noting
that lower courts treated Lopez and Morrison as invitations to engage in as-applied review).
17
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who favor broader use of facial challenges in individual rights cases appear to
oppose it in congressional power cases? And, most central to this article:
Given the Court’s recent reaffirmations of its general preference for as-applied
constitutional challenges—even in areas like Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment18 and abortion rights,19 where earlier decisions had seemed to
embrace one form or another of facial review20—why does the Court favor
facial challenges in Commerce Clause cases? This article offers answers to
those questions.
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I frames the issue by
describing the Court’s recent federalism decisions and revealing that beneath
the surface of the contentious debate over the substance of judicial doctrine
lies an equally thorny set of questions involving the appropriateness of facial
challenges in cases testing the scope of Congress’s power. These questions are
particularly difficult in the context of the Commerce Clause, where the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have suggested a strong preference for facial
challenges, in sharp contrast to the Court’s traditional inclination toward asapplied review.
Part II lays the theoretical groundwork for answering those questions
by explaining the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, as well
as the crucial but underappreciated distinction between two types of facial
challenge: the overbreadth facial challenge and the valid-rule facial challenge.21
18

United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).

19

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).

For apparently facial invalidations under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511, 532-33; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646-68; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83,
86-91; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601, 613; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373-74. For an apparently facial
validation under Section 5, see Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-40. Tennessee v. Lane seemed to mark the
Justices’ dawning awareness that review under Section 5 need not be facial. In an amusing
moment from the oral argument in Lane, Justice Breyer asked counsel for the State how a
court could declare a statute facially invalid as exceeding Congress’s Section 5 authority.
Justice Scalia retorted: “Justice Breyer’s question, how can you do that, reminds me of, you
know, there’s a story about the Baptist minister who was asked whether he believed in total
immersion baptism, and he said, believe in it, I’ve seen it done.” Tennessee v. Lane, transcript
of oral argument, 2004 WL 136390, at *13 (Jan. 13, 2004) (No. 02-1667). For an illuminating
discussion of facial challenges and federalism that emphasizes the Section 5 cases, see Gillian
E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L .REV. 873 (2005).
20

For facial invalidations involving abortion rights, see, e.g., Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922;
Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98.
21 I borrow these terms from Marc Isserles’s insightful article on the topic of facial
challenges. See Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359 (1998). For a thought-provoking application of Isserles’s
taxonomy in the administrative law context, see Stuart Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to do
About Statutory Challenges, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 427 (2003).
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Briefly put, an overbreadth facial challenge argues that a statute is
unconstitutional on its face because it sweeps within its coverage an
unacceptably large proportion of constitutionally unregulable activities.22 By
contrast, a valid-rule facial challenge argues that a statute is invalid on its face
because of a constitutional infirmity that inheres in the statute as written,
regardless of the facts or circumstances surrounding particular applications.23
This Part argues next that scholars have erred by analyzing all facial challenges
as if they were of the overbreadth as opposed to the valid-rule variety. That
misimpression, Part II explains, has led to two further errors: an overemphasis
on statutory severability as the key factor in determining whether facial review
is appropriate, and an assumption that facial review is called for if and only if
the constitutional claimant expressly frames her challenge in facial terms.24
Rather, the appropriateness of facial challenges—particularly valid-rule facial
challenges—is a function of the interaction between the challenged statute and
the applicable substantive constitutional doctrine.
Building on this groundwork, Part III examines the possible rationales
for the Court’s use of facial review in Commerce Clause cases. First, this Part
canvasses the Court’s case law concerning the proper mode of judicial review
in Commerce Clause cases and concludes that no consistent pattern emerges
from the precedential record: facial review, though discernable in earlier eras,
has become predominant in the Court’s jurisprudence only since Lopez. Next,
Part III explores several accounts of substantive constitutional meaning or
judicial doctrine that could plausibly explain the Court’s turn to the facial
perspective in Commerce Clause cases. It examines, in turn, a formalist
conception that characterizes rights as zones of privileged conduct while
envisioning government power as extending to the limits of its internally
22 Overbreadth facial challenges, at least in the First Amendment area, are also
characterized in practice by the requirement that the claimant’s own activity be constitutionally
regulable. See infra text accompanying note 72. I do not view this requirement as essential to
the definition of an overbreadth facial challenge, or to the distinction between overbreadth
and valid-rule facial challenges.

See infra Part II.A-B for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between
overbreadth facial challenges and valid-rule facial challenges.
23

This article uses the phrase “constitutional claimant” (or simply “claimant”) to
refer to any person challenging the constitutional validity of an action taken against her by the
government. Traditionally in American law, the classic constitutional claimant was a
defendant, facing criminal or other enforcement action brought by the government and
seeking to interpose a constitutional claim as a defense. In recent decades, however, with the
rise of actions for injunctive and declaratory relief, it has become commonplace for
constitutional claims to be advanced by plaintiffs. And because this article focuses on
challenges to the scope of congressional power rather than individual rights challenges, a term
such as “right-holder” would be inappropriate. Hence the neutral term “claimant.”
24
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defined scope; an understanding of the interstate commerce power as plenary
or judicially unconstrained; and a conception of the Commerce Clause as
including a prohibition on overbreadth. It concludes, however, that these
rationales do not adequately account for the Court’s resort to facial review.
Instead, Part III demonstrates that the soundest explanation for the Court’s
turn to facial review in Commerce Clause cases lies in an understanding of the
Clause’s meaning that incorporates a requirement of appropriate legislative
purpose. Part III concludes by setting forth and then responding to
descriptive, normative, and theoretical objections to this purpose-based
conception of the commerce power.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Over the past decade or so, the Supreme Court has issued an
extraordinary series of decisions concerning the scope of Congress’s power.
In the wake of the Court’s 1995 ruling constraining the scope of the Interstate
Commerce Clause in Lopez25—and particularly after its even more ambitious
holding in Morrison26—it appeared to many that the Rehnquist Court had
sparked a “federalism revolution.”27 Additional cases restricting Congress’s
power to regulate state government officials,28 Congress’s power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity,29 and Congress’s power to legislate pursuant to its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power30 all gave added ammunition to
the charge that the Court was revolutionizing the constitutional law of
25 514

U.S. 549 (1995).

529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison was a more ambitious holding than Lopez because,
unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was
supported by detailing congressional findings concerning the effect of the regulated activity on
the national economy. In addition, VAWA was arguably an appropriate exercise of Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, as it aimed to remedy gender-based inequities
in the criminal justice systems of the states.
26

27 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001);
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1053 (2001) (discussing the “constitutional revolution we are living through”); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS L. J.
569, 618 (2003) (discussing “the federalism revolution of the second Rehnquist Court”); J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2004)
(discussing “the federalism revolution of the Rehnquist Court”).
28

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.

898 (1997).
29 Seminole

Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706

(1999).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62 (2000); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27; Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
30
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federalism.
More recently, however, the picture has become blurred, as the Court
has handed down several decisions curtailing, or at least failing to follow
through on, its most adventurous federalism projects.31 The result has at times
seemed closer to confusion than revolution; discerning a pattern behind the
Court’s decisions on the scope of federal power is a difficult task. Indeed, it
would not be absurd to surmise that some federalism-minded members of the
Court—including the recently retired Justice O’Connor—simply said “thus far
and no further,” without supplying a compelling theory to explain their chosen
stopping point.32 As of this writing, it is far too early to tell whether the
replacements of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist by John Roberts and Justice
O’Connor by Samuel Alito will lend a new spark to the movement to restrict
federal power.
All of this—the seeming “federalism revolution” and its apparent
petering-out of late—has been the subject of sustained scholarly attention.33
Yet beneath the surface of the primary confusion of the federalism holdings, a
secondary confusion has persisted on the Court without receiving nearly as
much academic notice. This secondary confusion concerns the proper mode of
judicial review in cases testing the scope of congressional power. In particular,
the justices of the Supreme Court—and increasingly after Lopez, judges on the
lower federal courts—appear to be uncertain about whether challenges to the
scope of Congress’s power ought to be reviewed on a “facial” or an “asapplied” basis.
The confusion is at its greatest in the Commerce Clause area.34 The
31 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721 (2003); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
32 In light of Raich, Brandon Denning and Glenn Reynolds have complained that we
are stuck with an “Emily Litella Court,” after the Gilda Radner character from the early years
of Saturday Night Live who would regularly kvetch about some topic or other, only to
eventually say, “Never mind.” Denning & Reynolds, supra note 14, at 919.
33 On the federalism revolution, see, e.g., the authorities cited supra note 27. On the
petering-out, see, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Deregulatory Valence of Justice O’Connor’s
Federalism (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution That
Wasn’t, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (2004); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004); Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the
Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 142 (2001) (“Despite the clamor
over the Court’s new federalism doctrine, it has in fact only modestly trimmed congressional
power.”).
34 There seems to be a movement toward as-applied review with respect to other
sources of federal authority, such as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Spending Clause. See, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (Section 5); Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (Section 5);
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004) (Spending Clause); Salinas v. United States,
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Court decided the groundbreaking Lopez case on a facial basis: Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act for
all purposes and in all circumstances—and showed virtually no interest in the
particular facts of the case at bar.35 Likewise, in Morrison, the Court invalidated
the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act on its face,
without pausing to inquire whether the particular act of gender-motivated
violence at issue in the case before it, or other such acts that might have arisen
in subsequent cases, could have had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.36 Moreover, in both cases, the Court emphasized that the
challenged statute lacked a “jurisdictional element”—that is, a saving clause on
the face of the law which would require the constitutionally requisite
connection to interstate commerce to be pleaded and proven in every action
brought thereunder.37 The Court apparently reasoned that the presence of a
jurisdictional element would ensure the facial validity of the challenged
statute,38 such that the only available “as-applied challenge” to such a statute—
if one could call it that—would be an argument that the statute did not apply

522 U.S. 52 (1997) (Spending Clause); see generally Metzger, supra note 20. On the other side of
the equation, the Court appears unreflectively to apply facial review in cases involving the
separation of powers and the “anti-commandeering” doctrine. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (separation of powers); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)
(separation of powers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anti-commandeering);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (anti-commandeering).
35 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61 (describing the categories of activity that Congress is
permitted to regulate under the Commerce Clause and concluding that possession of guns
near schools is not such an activity). See Metzger, supra note 20 (describing Lopez and Morrison
as facial invalidations). As Metzger notes, see id. at 907, the Court in Lopez does mention in a
summary paragraph that “[r]espondent was a local student at a local school; there is no
indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce,” 514 U.S. at 567, but nothing in
the opinion appears to turn on this observation, which is therefore probably best read as not
detracting from the facial character of the rest of the Court’s opinion.
36 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09, 613-19 (reiterating from Lopez the categories of
activity that Congress is permitted to regulate under the Commerce Clause and concluding
that violence against women is not such an activity).
37 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (“§ 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce.”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“§ 13981 contains no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate
interstate commerce.”).

For instance, the post-Lopez version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
does contain a jurisdictional element, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A), has been upheld in the lower
courts. United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Dorsey, 418
F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005).
38
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to the facts of a particular case, simply as a matter of statutory construction.39
Relatedly, in subsequent cases, the Court has avoided direct confrontation with
the Commerce Clause by construing statutes narrowly to avoid potential
doubts about whether they exceed Congress’s regulatory power.40
Not surprisingly, Lopez and Morrison unleashed a torrent of Commerce
Clause challenges in the lower courts. And, also understandably, in many of
these cases—particularly the criminal ones—constitutional claimants argued
that federal statutes exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority both on
their face and as applied. What is rather surprising is that some lower courts
took Lopez and Morrison as an invitation to invalidate federal statutes on
Commerce Clause grounds, but only as applied to the claimant and others similarly
situated.41 For example, in 2001 the Sixth Circuit held that the federal child
pornography statute exceeded the federal commerce power as applied to a
defendant who took pictures of a minor who was nearly 18 years old, where
the photographer did not intend to distribute the pictures to others.42
Likewise, in 2003 the Ninth Circuit invalidated the same statute as applied to
“simple intrastate possession of a visual depiction (or depictions) that has not
been mailed, shipped, or transported interstate and is not intended for
interstate distribution, or for any economic or commercial use, including the
exchange of the prohibited material for other prohibited material.”43 The
Eleventh Circuit followed suit, striking down the child pornography statute as
applied to intrastate possession of child pornography where the diskettes on
39 The converse of the proposition in the text, however, is not true; that is, the
absence of a jurisdictional element does not doom a statute to facial invalidity. See Sabri, 541
U.S. at 605 (“We simply do not presume the unconstitutionality of federal criminal statutes
lacking explicit provision of a jurisdictional hook…”); see also United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d
589, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2002); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068; United States v. Morales-DeJesus,
372 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2004).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (holding, in order to avoid
constitutional doubts, that a residence not used for any commercial purpose is not covered by
the federal arson statute); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding, in order to avoid constitutional doubts, that the
definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act does not include intrastate waters
used as habitat by migratory birds).

See generally Reynolds & Denning, supra note 17 (noting that lower courts treated
Lopez and Morrison as invitations to engage in as-applied review). In such cases, courts
struggled with the question of how to characterize the appropriate activity or subclass for
purposes of as-applied review. For a helpful and engaging guide to that question, see John
Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV.
174 (1998).
41

42

United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).

43

United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003).
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which the pornography was copied traveled in interstate commerce before
they contained the images in question.44
The Ninth Circuit soon reaffirmed its as-applied approach to the
Commerce Clause in holding that the federal prohibition on machine gun
possession was unconstitutional as applied to the possession of a homemade
machine gun made partly out of ready-made parts that had traveled in
interstate commerce and partly out of parts the defendant had machined
himself.45 “[T]he Supreme Court has always entertained as-applied challenges
under the Commerce Clause,” wrote Judge Kozinski. “Indeed, it is hard to
believe the Court would ever eliminate as-applied challenges for one particular
area of constitutional law.”46 And, of course, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
the Raich case, later reversed by the Supreme Court, was an as-applied
invalidation of the Controlled Substances Act under the Commerce Clause.47
Adding to the confusion, in the years following Lopez and Morrison
several lower courts upheld statutes against Commerce Clause attack, but only
as applied, reserving for future litigation the question whether the statute could
validly be enforced in other circumstances. Thus, in 2003 the Fifth Circuit
upheld the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) as applied to the “Cave Species,”
several endangered arachnids and insects threatened by the activities of a real
estate developer.48 Similarly, in 2003 the D.C. Circuit upheld the ESA as
applied to a real estate developer’s proposed housing project, which the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service concluded jeopardized the continued existence
of the arroyo southwestern toad.49 And the Tenth Circuit, in April 2005,
upheld the federal child pornography statute as applied to a defendant who
transported boys across state lines for illicit photography for which they were
compensated.50 In that case, Judge McConnell maintained that “[t]he existence
44 United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated and
remanded, 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005). See also United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005) (invalidating federal child pornography
statute as applied to intrastate production and possession).

United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, vacated and
remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
45

46

Id. at 1141, 1142.

47 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub. nom. Gonzales v. Raich,
125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
48 GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2898 (2005).

Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh’g en banc denied,
334 F.3d 1158 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
49

United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir., Apr 19, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 299 (2005).
50
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and coherence of ‘as applied’ challenges under the Commerce Clause
necessarily presupposes that the constitutionality of some applications of a
facially valid statute will, and some will not, have sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce, and that this will be based on the particular facts of the case.”51
By contrast, other lower court judges, post-Lopez/Morrison, suggested
that Commerce Clause review should always—or nearly always—be facial in
nature. For instance, Judge Trott of the Ninth Circuit dissented from an asapplied invalidation of the child pornography statute, contending that facial
challenges were de rigueur in Commerce Clause cases: “Congress has declared
that an entire class of activities substantially affects interstate commerce. That
activity is child pornography. To the statute, it is immaterial that the particular
child pornography under scrutiny was not produced for sale or trade.”52 Judge
Trott suggested that the panel majority’s ostensibly as-applied disposition
made sense only if understood either as (a) an act of statutory interpretation
holding that the statute did not to apply to interstate non-commercial
possession, or (b) in effect a facial invalidation of the statute on grounds of
overbreadth.53 And on the Third Circuit, then-Judge Alito appeared to argue
in a dissent that the federal machine gun possession statute was invalid on its
face, owing to its lack of either a jurisdictional element or legislative findings
showing a link between intrastate possession of machine guns and interstate
commerce.54
Then came Raich, in which the Court appeared (at least at first glance)
to take a sharp turn away from its previous facial approach to the Commerce
Clause. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion took pains to characterize Raich as
an as-applied challenge, distinct from the facial challenges entertained in Lopez
51 Id. at 869. See also, e.g., United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 914 (2003) (upholding certain provisions of the Clean Air Act and their implementing
regulations as applied to defendant’s circumvention of asbestos abatement requirements).
52

McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1141 (Trott, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

53

Id. at 1140 (Trott, J., dissenting).

United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997). Alito dissented from an opinion that appeared to uphold the
machine gun statute on its face. Id. at 276-85. See generally Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the
Commerce Clause on its Face: Why Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE
WESTERN L. REV. 161 (2004) (asserting that text and structure of Commerce Clause
necessitate judicial inquiry into classes of activities rather than claimant’s particular conduct).
54

To add further perplexity to the mix, at least one lower court judge argued that asapplied challenges are sometimes available under the Commerce Clause, but only where the facts
being used to distinguish the claimant’s case are not facts that go to the economic or
commercial nature of the claimant’s conduct. See United States v. Morales-DeJesus, 372 F.3d 6,
17-20 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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and Morrison:
Here, respondents ask us to excise individual applications of a
concededly valid statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez
and Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or
provision fell outside Congress’ commerce power in its
entirety. This distinction is pivotal for we have often reiterated
that where the class of activities is regulated and that class is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to
excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.55
But the Court’s insistence that it was sidestepping facial review in Raich rang
hollow. In reality, the Court refused to take meaningful account of the
particular nature or extent of the respondents’ activities, or of the “subclass”
of conduct carved out by the Ninth Circuit and by California law, saying only
that Congress could rationally view the subclass as an essential part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme.56 Moreover, the outcome in the case—
upholding the federal drug trafficking statute even as applied to the
respondents, while declining to overrule Lopez or Morrison—strongly suggests
that the Court simply disfavors as-applied challenges altogether in the
Commerce Clause area.57 After all, if the Raich claimants, whose activities were
neither interstate nor commercial, could not launch a successful as-applied
challenge to an otherwise valid statute, it stands to reason that virtually no one
can. Raich is, in essence, a facial validation of the Controlled Substances Act for
Commerce Clause purposes.
In short, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich all resulted in facial adjudications,
an outcome that clashes with the Court’s usual preference for as-applied
review. Why was a majority of the Court in Raich unwilling to engage in asapplied invalidation, a disposition that is familiar and regularly employed in
many areas of constitutional law? And—perhaps even more puzzlingly, in
light of the Court’s subsequent decisions upholding exercises of Congress’s
Section 5 authority as applied in Lane and Georgia—why was the majority in
Lopez and Morrison unwilling even to entertain the possibility that the statutes
challenged in those cases could be upheld as applied in particular
circumstances, say, on the grounds that a particular gun carried near a school
55 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court attempted to explain its divergence from its prior facial approach in terms of the
arguments made by the parties, but the explanation seems incomplete, if not disingenuous. As
I explain infra Part II.C, the choice between facial and as-applied review does not turn on the
way in which a claimant frames her challenge.
56

Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211-12.

57

See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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has traveled in interstate commerce (as the vast majority of guns no doubt
have)58 or that a particular gender-based assault could substantially affect
interstate commerce?
This article provides answers to these vexing questions. But first some
theoretical groundwork must be laid.
II. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES, OVERBREADTH FACIAL CHALLENGES, AND
VALID-RULE FACIAL CHALLENGES
A. The distinction between as-applied and facial challenges.
The conventional account of the distinction between facial vs. asapplied challenges begins with the simple observation that a constitutional
claimant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute in two ways. She can
challenge the validity of the statute “on its face”—that is, she can argue that
the statute as a whole is unconstitutional as written or authoritatively
construed.59 Alternatively, she can challenge the validity of the statute “as
applied”—that is, she can argue that the statute produced an unconstitutional
result when it was applied to her.60 Typically, facial and as-applied challenges
are not mutually exclusive options for a constitutional claimant: with one
important exception to be mentioned shortly, the same claimant in the same
case can generally launch both facial and as-applied challenges to the same
statute.61
Given that federal courts insist upon a concrete “case or controversy”
before exercising jurisdiction and are reluctant to invalidate any more of a
legislature’s handiwork than is necessary, the as-applied mode of judicial
review has traditionally been the predominant one.62 To understand the classic
58 See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 953
(1997) (“Most guns are manufactured in one of two states and are then shipped to other
states.”).

The phrasing here is inevitably somewhat imprecise: a claimant could launch a
“facial” challenge without arguing that an entire statute is invalid. A facial challenge can allege
the invalidity of a particular statutory provision. The important point is that the challenged
provision’s constitutional validity would be adjudicated without reference to the particular
facts of the claimant’s situation.
59

60 Or, in the case of a pre-enforcement challenge, that the statute will produce an
unconstitutional result as soon as it is applied to her in the future. The distinction between
facial and as-applied challenges bears no necessary relation to the distinction between pre– and
post-enforcement challenges.
61 The exception is First Amendment overbreadth, discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 65-72.
62 See, e.g., Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 967-69 (explaining the Court’s general preference for
as-applied invalidation, on grounds of judicial restraint, administrability, and legislative intent).
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idea of an as-applied challenge, imagine a statute that makes it a crime to
disturb the peace. A flag-burning antiwar protester charged with violating this
hypothetical statute would be best served to argue that the statute violates his
constitutional rights as applied. While the disturbing-the-peace statute might
be perfectly constitutional on its face,63 he would argue that its application to
him, a peaceful protester engaged in “symbolic speech,” violates his First
Amendment rights.64
Because the as-applied mode of review makes such a natural fit with
traditional federal-court principles of justiciability and judicial restraint, it is
only in the past half-century or so that the distinction between facial and asapplied challenges has become a major focus of judicial and academic debate.
The issue rose to prominence in the context of the First Amendment, and
more particularly in the context of an exception to as-applied review known as
the overbreadth doctrine. I shall argue later that the overbreadth doctrine
does not represent the most important type of facial challenge, but because for
many judges and scholars overbreadth is the paradigm for all facial challenges,
it is worth addressing first and in some detail.
The 1981 case of Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim nicely illustrates the
doctrine of overbreadth.65 In Schad, a city had enacted an ordinance
prohibiting all live entertainment in any commercial zone.66 The operators of
an adult bookstore that offered coin-operated booths featuring nude dancers
challenged the statute under the First Amendment. The Court held the statute
invalid on its face, concluding that it swept within its prohibition too wide a
swath of protected speech, including “the commercial production of plays,
concerts, musicals, dance, or any other form of live entertainment,”67 without
sufficient justification. In an overbreadth case like Schad, the Court has
explained, the claimant is permitted to raise a claim of facial invalidity largely
because of a judicial concern that the challenged statute would otherwise
“chill” the protected expression of parties other than the claimant.68 Thus, in
63 I am unaware of any case in which the Supreme Court has held that a traditional
disturbance of the peace statute is facially unconstitutional.
64 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating disturbance of the peace
statute as applied to defendant who appeared in county courthouse wearing a jacket bearing
the words “Fuck the Draft”).
65

452 U.S. 61 (1981).

66

Id. at 63 & n.1.

67

Id. at 66.

68 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972). In the First Amendment
area, the Court has stated that a statute must sweep in a “substantial” amount of protected
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effect, the overbreadth claimant vindicates the constitutional rights of third
parties not before the Court.69 Because concerns about chilling effects and the
rights of third parties are not limited to the First Amendment context, the
Court has sometimes applied a species of overbreadth doctrine in other types
of individual rights cases. The “undue burden” test in the area of abortion
rights, for example, has much in common with overbreadth analysis.70
The fact that a claimant may not have a valid as-applied challenge—for
instance, at the time of Schad, it was unclear whether nude dancing was a form
of protected expression within the ambit of the First Amendment71—is no
barrier to raising an overbreadth challenge. To the contrary, the Court has
stated that claimants to whom a valid as-applied challenge is available are not
permitted to bring a First Amendment overbreadth challenge. In the 1985
case of Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., the Court held that a facial challenge
alleging First Amendment overbreadth could not be brought by a claimant
who alleged that his own expressive conduct was constitutionally protected.72
In other words, as-applied challenges and facial challenges of the First
speech in order for an overbreadth facial challenge to succeed. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
See, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988);
Sec’y of State v. J.H. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984). It is important to note that the
claimant must still possess Article III standing to challenge the statute in federal court.
Although the Court continues to view overbreadth as an exception to the usual limitations on
third-party standing, it has made clear that those limitations are prudential and do not flow
from Article III. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 n.7 (2004).
69

70 See, e.g., John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53
(2004); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 26471 (1994) [hereinafter Dorf, Facial Challenges] (showing that, in cases concerning “fundamental
rights” under the Due Process Clause, the Court has often applied something that looks very
much like overbreadth review, asking whether the challenged statute on its face unduly
burdens or chills protected conduct).

The Court itself has stated that there are other doctrinal areas besides the First
Amendment in which it has “recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth
(though not necessarily using that term).” Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10, citing Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938-946 (abortion
rights); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-35 (Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Ayotte,
126 S. Ct. 961 (suggesting a return on the part of the Court to a preference for as-applied
review even in the abortion area).
See Schad, 452 U.S. at 66 (“[A]s the state courts in this case recognized, nude
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation.”) (citations
omitted); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that nude dancing “is
expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as
only marginally so”).
71

72 472

U.S. 491, 503 (1985).
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Amendment overbreadth variety are mutually exclusive. This holding appears
to be limited to First Amendment overbreadth, as opposed to overbreadth
generally. It is also subject to criticism on the grounds that it extends greater
judicial solicitude to those engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct
than to those whose conduct is protected.73
With the as-applied and overbreadth challenges behind us (and the
valid-rule facial challenge still ahead of us), we can ask the question that has
preoccupied courts and scholars for many years, particularly in the individual
rights context: In what circumstances should a statute be struck down on its
face? The Court’s traditional answer has been: rarely. The Court has
explained that the act of striking down a statute on its face stands in tension
with several traditional components of the federal judicial role, including a
preference for resolving concrete disputes rather than abstract or speculative
questions; a deference to legislative judgments; and a reluctance to resort to
the “strong medicine” of constitutional invalidation unless absolutely
necessary.74 Accordingly, the Court has consistently held, at least in the
individual rights context, that facial invalidations should be the exception
rather than the rule.75
The Court laid down what appeared to be a general rule for the
availability of facial challenges in United States v. Salerno, which involved a facial
challenge to the Bail Reform Act under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The
Court emphasized that a claimant raising a facial challenge carries a “heavy
burden.”76 “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully,” observed Chief Justice Rehnquist
for the Court, “since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
73 The claimant could also raise a nonconstitutional challenge, arguing that the court
should adopt a narrow construction of the statute such that the claimant’s conduct is deemed
unregulated simply as a matter of statutory construction. Such an argument would be
strengthened by a showing that the broader interpretation would violate the Constitution, or at
least raise difficult constitutional questions. Strategies of constitutional avoidance have a long
pedigree and are commonly used by courts where statutory language permits (and sometimes
even where it doesn’t). The practical result from the standpoint of the claimant is comparable
to an as-applied invalidation, with the important difference being that the court does not bring
the full power of judicial review to bear on the statute. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1945 (1997); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-11 (“[C]ourts are not roving commissions
assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.”).
74

75 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1971).
76 481

U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
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exists under which the Act would be valid.”77 The Court in Salerno expressly
exempted overbreadth challenges from its “no set of circumstances”
requirement, but stated that overbreadth challenges were restricted to “the
limited context of the First Amendment.”78 The Court in Salerno had little
difficulty concluding that constitutionally valid applications of the Bail Reform
Act existed, and thus rejected the defendants’ facial challenges.79
Lower courts in many cases have treated Salerno as setting forth an
across-the-board threshold test for the availability of facial challenges,
regardless of the constitutional clause being relied upon by the claimant, with
the exception of First Amendment overbreadth claims and (in most circuits)
abortion rights claims.80 But other courts, and several scholars, have criticized
the Salerno test as a normative matter, or denied its broad applicability as a
descriptive matter, or both.81 As Marc Isserles has described, critics of Salerno
have argued that the “no set of circumstances” test consigns all facial
challenges to inevitable failure, because courts can always envision some
hypothetical valid application of the challenged statute; leaves litigants with no
77 Id.
78 Id.
79

Id. at 746-55.

80 See, e.g., Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 648 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2003); United
States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2004); Rosen v. Goetz, 410 F.3d 919, 933 (6th
Cir. 2005); Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 335 F.3d
607, 619-20 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1224 & n.2 (11th Cir.
2005); cf. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (“Given United States v. Salerno … a facial challenge can succeed only if there are no
circumstances in which the Act at issue can be applied without violating the Commerce
Clause”); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, No. 04-5201-CV, at *11-12 (2d Cir., Jan. 31, 2006)
(Walker, C.J., concurring).

Salerno, as mentioned, expressly excludes First Amendment overbreadth claims from
the scope of its self-styled threshold test. 481 U.S. at 745. As for the abortion rights context,
most circuits currently apply the Casey “undue burden” test, as augmented by the Stenberg
health exception requirement, rather than Salerno. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v.
Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 627-28 (2005) (collecting cases); Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 79495 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 2006 WL 385614 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No. 05-380) (discussing
the tension between the Casey/Stenberg and Salerno standards); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and
County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While we have held that Casey
‘overruled Salerno in the context of facial challenges to abortion statutes,’ we will not reject
Salerno in other contexts until a majority of the Supreme Court clearly directs us to do so.”)
(citation omitted); Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d
910, 919 (10th Cir. 2002).
See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 70; Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1072 n.34 (1997); John Christopher Ford, The Casey
Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (1997).
81

Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause

18

real incentive to launch a facial as well as an as-applied challenge; has little
grounding in pre-Salerno case law and was arguably dicta in Salerno itself; and
unduly privileges First Amendment overbreadth over other forms of facial
challenge.82
On the Supreme Court itself, Justice Stevens has emerged as the
primary champion of a narrow reading of Salerno in the individual rights
context, and Justice Scalia as its primary defender. For instance, in the 1999
case of City of Chicago v. Morales, Justice Stevens (writing for a plurality of four
justices) held a gang loitering ordinance facially unconstitutional on vagueness
grounds under the Due Process Clause.83 Justice Scalia, in dissent, vigorously
insisted that the plurality’s disposition ran afoul of Salerno’s requirement, since
(according to Justice Scalia) it was possible to imagine a scenario in which the
ordinance’s application to a particular group of loiterers would not be
impermissibly vague.84 In response, Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion asserted
that “[t]o the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial
challenges, it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the decisive
factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself.”85 Justices Stevens
and Scalia have also clashed over the facial vs. as-applied issue in separate
statements concerning the denial of certiorari in abortion cases.86 The 2006
Ayotte decision did not so much resolve this clash as institute a temporary
truce: Justice O’Connor’s brief opinion for a unanimous Court never mentions
Salerno and leaves it to the lower courts to fashion an appropriate remedy to
address the risks posed by a parental notification statute that lacks an express

82 Isserles,

supra note 21, at 372-75.

83 Chicago

v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55, 64 (1999).

Id. at 81-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (imagining a thinly disguised version of West Side
Story unfolding on the South Side of Chicago).
84

85 Id.

at 55 n.22 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court).

86 Compare Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari) (“While a facial challenge may be more difficult to mount
than an as-applied challenge, the dicta in Salerno ‘does not accurately characterize the standard
for deciding facial challenges,’ and ‘neither accurately reflects the Court’s practice with respect
to facial challenges, nor is it consistent with a wide array of legal principles.’”) with id. at 1178
(Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“It has become questionable whether, for
some reason, this clear principle [i.e., Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” test] does not apply
in abortion cases”). See also, e.g., Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506
U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that the Ninth
Circuit’s facial invalidation of a Guam law outlawing abortions except in cases of medical
emergency “seems to me wrong, since there are apparently some applications of the statute
that are perfectly constitutional”).
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exception for cases of medical emergency.87
Although Justices Stevens and Scalia have yet to resolve their debate
over the circumstances in which facial challenges are properly entertained by
courts, a proper understanding of that debate can be greatly enhanced by
identifying a second type of facial challenge, distinct from the overbreadth
challenge—namely, the valid-rule facial challenge.88
B. Valid-rule facial challenges.
A valid-rule facial challenge asserts that a statute is invalid on its face as
written and authoritatively construed, when measured against the applicable
substantive constitutional doctrine, without reference to the facts or
circumstances of particular applications. The groundwork for the current
understanding of valid-rule facial challenges was laid by Henry Monaghan in a
celebrated 1981 article reinterpreting First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.89
According to Monaghan, First Amendment overbreadth claims are not
grounded in an exception to the usual prudential rules against third-party
standing.90 Instead, Monaghan argues, overbreadth claims are best understood
as instances of the general principle that every litigant must be permitted to
vindicate his own right to be judged by a constitutionally valid rule of law:
The operative rule, either as enacted or construed, must
conform to the Constitution. Thus, in addition to a claim of
privilege, a litigant has always been permitted to make another,
equally “conventional” challenge: He can insist that his
conduct be judged in accordance with a rule that is
constitutionally valid. In sharp contrast to a fact-dependent
privilege claim, a challenge to the content of the rule applied is
independent of the specific facts of the litigant’s predicament.
Rather, it speaks to the relationship between the facial content
of the rule being applied to the facts and the applicable
constitutional law, and it insists that that rule itself be valid.91
On Monaghan’s view, First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, properly
understood, flows not from some special exception to the procedural threshold
requirements of standing but from the substantive requirements of the First
Amendment itself, particularly the requirements of legislative precision and
87

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).

88 I have borrowed the term “valid rule facial challenge” (with an additional hyphen)
from Marc Isserles. See Isserles, supra note 21.
89 Henry

Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1.

90

Id. at 13.

91

Id. at 8.

Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause

20

least-restrictive means.92
Monaghan’s specific reinterpretation of First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, it should be noted, has not been embraced by the Supreme Court,
which generally continues to view overbreadth as an exception to the bar on
third-party standing.93 But his insight that litigants have a personal right to be
judged according to a valid rule of law can be viewed as underlying several
holdings of the Supreme Court,94 and has won broad acceptance among
scholars.95
Marc Isserles builds upon Monaghan’s basic insight by reconciling
Salerno with the broad availability of facial challenges in some areas of
constitutional law outside the First Amendment.96 As Isserles demonstrates,
critics of Salerno make the common error of assuming that all facial challenges
are of the overbreadth variety.97 Isserles, by contrast, draws a sharp distinction
between overbreadth challenges and what he calls “valid rule facial
challenges.” Unlike Monaghan, Isserles accepts at face value the Court’s
repeated statements that overbreadth facial challenges are usually barred by
rules prohibiting third-party standing, i.e., rules forbidding one person to raise
the constitutional claims of another.98 Where overbreadth facial challenges are
permitted—typically, though not exclusively, in cases involving First
Amendment rights—it is because the Court is willing to grant a narrow
92

Id. at 24-25, 37-39.

93 See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (“[T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of
standing to permit—in the First Amendment area—attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.”) (citation omitted); but see
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 (1982) (citing Monaghan for the proposition that
“[a] person whose activity may be constitutionally regulated nevertheless may argue that the
statute under which he is convicted or regulated is invalid on its face”).
94 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 n.3 (1992); see also generally
Dorf, supra note 70 (arguing that the valid rule requirement explains much of existing Supreme
Court constitutional law doctrine).
95 See Dorf, supra note 70; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and
Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000) [hereinafter Fallon, As-Applied]; Isserles,
supra note 21; but see Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: the Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 160 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Rights Against Rules]
(“Unlike Monaghan, I think it is a grave mistake to conceptualize this judicial task as resting
upon the proposition that, in his words: ‘[A] litigant has always had the right to be judged in
accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law.’”).
96

See Isserles, supra note 21.

97

Id. at 366.

98

Id. at 366, 370.
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exception to the usual prohibition on third-party standing, principally in order
to prevent parties not before the court from being “chilled” in the exercise of
protected rights for fear of prosecution. The important point, for Isserles, is
that a statute that is subject to invalidation for unconstitutional overbreadth
still has—indeed, by definition must have—some constitutionally valid
applications. Thus, Salerno does not apply to overbreadth challenges, as the
Court itself recognized in that case.
The second type of facial challenge is the “valid rule facial challenge.”
Following Monaghan, Isserles argues that in addition to arguing overbreadth, a
claimant may assert her own personal right to be judged under a
constitutionally valid rule of law.99 The valid-rule facial challenge differs from
the overbreadth facial challenge in that it does not require any exception to the
normal rules barring third-party standing, and it does not depend for its
success on an examination of the constitutionality of any number of actual or
potential statutory applications.100 On the contrary, because the constitutional
infirmity inheres in the statute as it is written and authoritatively construed,
that infirmity could be said to pervade all of the statute’s actual or potential
applications.101 For the same reason, the question of statutory severability is
not relevant in the context of a successful valid rule facial challenge, because
there are no “valid applications” to remain behind after the invalid ones are
severed.102 Thus, Isserles concludes,
[a] valid rule facial challenge is a constitutional challenge that, if
successful, satisfies Salerno’s “no set of circumstances”
99

Id. at 387.
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Id.

101

Id.

102 Id. at 407-08.
Statutory severance may still come into play, of course, if a
particular provision of a larger statute is struck down facially as an invalid rule of law. Though
the provision as a whole would be invalidated, the remainder of the statute could stand,
assuming the applicable test for severability is satisfied.

In a similar vein, a statute might take the form of a rule plus an exception, as in
Dorf’s example of a statute that criminalizes murder but exempts lynching. Michael C. Dorf,
The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 269, 288-89 (2000) [hereinafter Dorf, Heterogeneity].
If the grammatically separable exception for lynching is deemed invalid, it is probably wisest
for a court to hold only that the exception is invalid, rather than the entire statute. Of course,
a federal court will often refrain from making such severance decisions if the statute under
review is a state statute that has not been authoritatively construed; the choice of whether to
strike some or all of the statute should be left to the state. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942). In addition, Due Process concerns could prevent partial invalidation
if the challenger could have reasonably relied on the pre-invalidation version of the statute
without fair notice of its unconstitutionality. See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1345
n.124.
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language. That language, however, does not set forth an
application-specific method of proof or a facial challenge
“test,” but is rather a descriptive claim about a statute that on
its face expresses an invalid rule of law.103
A successful valid-rule facial challenge is not always available to
claimants. But, as Isserles explains, its availability is not a function of Salerno’s
“no set of circumstances” formulation (which merely describes a successful valid
rule facial challenge). “Rather, a court’s choice between facial and as-applied
invalidation is constrained by the structural relationship between the kind of
constitutional challenge asserted, the way in which the statute is written and
authoritatively construed, and the substantive constitutional doctrine on which
the challenge is based.”104 Salerno is thus not a universally applicable threshold
requirement for the availability of a facial challenge, but instead is best viewed
as a rather clumsy articulation of the state of affairs that obtains when a validrule facial challenge succeeds: there are no valid “applications,” because the
rule itself is constitutionally deficient.105
The case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul106 provides convenient
illustrations of both types of facial challenge. The case involved a First
Amendment challenge to a city ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to
display a symbol or other object “which one knows or has reasonable grounds
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender.”107 The Minnesota Supreme Court had given
the ordinance a limiting construction, holding that it applied only to “fighting
words,” i.e., expressions which themselves inflict harm or incite imminent
violence and are not protected by the First Amendment.108 The constitutional
claimant was a juvenile whose conduct—burning a cross on the lawn of a
black family—plainly could have been proscribed by any number of valid
103

Isserles, supra note 21, at 387.

104

Id. at 423.

To be sure, it would not be linguistically incoherent to maintain that Salerno states
a threshold requirement even for valid-rule facial challenges, in the sense that an intrinsically
defective statute by definition cannot have any valid applications. Such an attempt to
resuscitate Salerno as an across-the-board prerequisite for facial review, however, would be
both needlessly circuitous and potentially misleading, because the court’s inquiry in a valid-rule
facial challenge has nothing to do with the circumstances of particular applications, and
because fanciful potential “valid applications,” even of an invalid rule, are often easy enough
to concoct.
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505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
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Id. at 380-81.
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statutes.109 Writing the opinion of the Court for five justices, however, Justice
Scalia held the challenged ordinance facially unconstitutional because it
discriminated among acts of symbolic speech on the basis of their content.110
Even though the claimant’s own conduct was constitutionally unprotected, the
content discrimination on the face of the ordinance rendered it an invalid rule
for all purposes, because such discrimination “raises the specter that the
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace.”111 Justice White, writing for four justices, agreed that the
ordinance was facially invalid, but reached this conclusion on overbreadth
grounds, reasoning that the statute (even as narrowed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court) swept in an unacceptable amount of constitutionally protected
speech.112 Both opinions resulted in facial invalidation—and in both, the fact
that the claimant’s conduct was constitutionally regulable made no
difference—but Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court treated the case as a
valid-rule facial challenge, while Justice White’s opinion treated it as an
overbreadth facial challenge.113
C. Determining when facial review is appropriate: specification,
severability, and substantive constitutional doctrine.
Scholars agree that facial adjudication occurs more frequently than the
Supreme Court’s stingy, and ostensibly broadly applicable, test in Salerno would
indicate. Michael Dorf, in particular, has demonstrated that facial challenges
turn out to be far more common that the Supreme Court has thus far seen fit
to admit; in short, the “exception to the rule” is not especially exceptional after
all.114 Most importantly from the point of view of this article, facial challenges
109

Id. at 380 & n.1.

110

Id. at 381-95.

111 Id. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
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Id. at 411-14 (White, J., concurring).

R.A.V. also provides some support for another of this article’s claims: that the
claimant’s own framing of his case is not dispositive of the availability of a valid-rule facial
challenge. As Justice White pointed out, id. at 398 n.1 (White, J., concurring), the claimant in
R.A.V. framed his challenge almost exclusively in overbreadth terms, yet this did not prevent
a majority of the Court from addressing the case as a valid-rule facial challenge.
113

114 Dorf, Facial Challenges, supra note 70. Richard Fallon, in an influential article,
disagrees to some extent. Fallon concludes that facial challenges ought to be relatively rare,
and that for reasons of institutional prudence courts should err on the side of using the
traditional as-applied model. See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1352. Only where
“constitutional values are unusually vulnerable,” especially when individual liberties are subject
to a potential chilling effect, should courts readily adopt “tests that invite rulings of facial
invalidity and preclude the case-by-case curing of statutory defects.” Id.
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often succeed where a court concludes that a statute is motivated by an
impermissible legislative purpose.115 Doctrinal tests that turn at least in part on
an examination of legislative purpose—and that result in valid-rule facial
review—are often used under the Equal Protection, Free Speech, dormant
Commerce, and Establishment Clauses.116 In addition, as Isserles points out,
facial review may be appropriate in cases applying “suspect classification” tests
under the Equal Protection and Free Speech Clauses,117 and “void for
vagueness” tests under the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses. In all of
these doctrinal areas, the Court has adopted substantive tests of constitutional
validity which focus attention on the terms of the statute itself, or its purpose,
history or structure, rather than on particular applications—in short, the Court
has engaged in valid-rule facial review.
Some constitutional doctrines are not as readily conducive to facial
review, but do not necessarily lend themselves to traditional as-applied
treatment either. Such hybrid doctrines include those which call for some
degree of regulatory “fit,” either via a “narrow tailoring” or “least restrictive
alternative” test, a “congruence and proportionality” test, or a general
balancing of the state’s regulatory interests with the importance of the
individual freedom at stake.118 On the one hand, such doctrines often require
a court to make an empirical or predictive judgment about how the challenged
statute has been or will be applied, and the likely effects of such application—
the kind of judgment that is well suited to as-applied adjudication. On the
other hand, such doctrines typically ask the court to assess the “fit” between
regulatory means and ends at the level of the statute itself, regardless of the
validity of particular applications. Thus, as Isserles points out, “even though
[the narrow tailoring] inquiry necessarily involves an empirical judgment about
the world, means/end scrutiny is a generalized inquiry that does not involve an
assessment of particular, fact-dependent features of specific statutory
applications.”119

115 Id.
116

at 264-271.

Isserles, supra note 21, at 440.

117 Id. at 442-43. Fallon also includes a category he labels “forbidden content” tests,
used in those rare areas in which the Court has held that enactment of a particular form of
statute is entirely off-limits to the legislature. Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 67, 83-84.
An example might include a statute establishing a tax or fee as a prerequisite to voting. See
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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Perhaps the fullest analysis of the circumstances in which facial
challenges ought to be entertained has been provided by Richard Fallon.120 On
Fallon’s view, the key considerations in determining the appropriateness of
facial adjudication are what he calls “specification” and “separability.”121
Fallon argues that substantive doctrinal tests should be viewed as calling for
facial review only when those tests “require that a statute be relatively fully
specified at the time of its first application and, relatedly, call for a ‘facial’
determination of constitutional validity.”122 When a statute is deemed invalid
under such a test, “its otherwise valid subrules will be deemed inseparable
from valid ones and therefore unenforceable.”123
Fallon’s criterion of specification is useful and sensible: it would be
imprudent for a court to strike down a statute in all its applications if the court
were unsure what those applications might turn out to look like. But it is his
concept of separability that has attracted the most attention; other scholars,
both before and after Fallon, have placed great emphasis on this concept in
seeking to explain when facial review is appropriate.124 For example, Michael
Dorf seeks to explain the Salerno “no set of circumstances” rule by arguing that
it sets forth an implicit “presumption of severability.”125 When a court applies
this presumption, Dorf reasons, it in effect tells the claimant, “This statute is
constitutionally valid as applied to you. As for its allegedly unconstitutional
applications to other people, we will wait for those cases to arise. And we’ll
assume now that if we do get around to striking down other applications of
this statute, those applications will prove to be severable, leaving the valid
remainder of the statute (including the part that we apply to you today)
intact.”126 Similarly, Gillian Metzger places the notion of a presumption of
120

Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95.

121 Id. at 1325 & n.31 (adapting the terms “specify” and “specification” from Henry
S. Richardson, Specifying Norms As a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 279 (1990)).
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Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1342.
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Most other scholars, such as Dorf and Metzger, use the more common term
“severability” rather than Fallon’s term “separability.” Nothing appears to turn on this
semantic distinction.
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Dorf also views this presumption as implicit in the much earlier case of Yazoo &
Mississippi R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912), in which the Court rejected a
Due Process and Equal Protection challenge to a statute requiring railroads to promptly settle
claims for lost or damaged goods, holding that the statute was constitutional as applied to the
facts of the case at bar. Indeed, Dorf sometimes refers to the “Yazoo/Salerno presumption of
severability.” See, e.g., Dorf, Facial Challenges, supra note 70, at 251.
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severability at the center of her argument that facial challenges should not be
the norm in cases arising under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power.127
Yet the centrality of severability analysis to the question of facial vs. asapplied review has been overstated by these commentators, primarily because
they have approached the question from the standpoint of overbreadth as the
exclusive model for facial challenges. Contrary to the existing literature, not all
successful facial challenges entail overcoming a presumption of severability,
for two related reasons. First, these commentators’ emphasis on severability
gives short shrift to the possibility of facial validation. Typically, when a court
rebuffs a constitutional challenge, it leaves open the possibility of later asapplied challenges, as Dorf rightly points out. But, at least in certain doctrinal
contexts, courts can go further, not only rejecting the claimant’s facial
challenge but declaring or implying that constitutional claims of the kind raised
by the claimant simply cannot be successfully pressed against the challenged
statute.
Perhaps the simplest example of a facial validation arises in the context
of what Dorf himself, in a paper co-authored with Matthew Adler, has called a
“constitutional existence condition.”128 All federal statutes must be enacted in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution. If a statute were challenged as lacking a constitutional existence
condition, and the challenge failed on the merits, the Court’s ruling would
result in a facial validation. To taking the limiting case, imagine that a claimant
alleges that a statute is unconstitutional because the version of the bill passed
by Congress was printed in a different typeface from the one signed by the
President. A court that reached the merits of such a claim would no doubt
hold that the difference in typeface was constitutionally irrelevant: the statute
is valid on its face and no further as-applied challenges are necessary to assess
its validity.129 (If this example strikes some readers as too absurd to
contemplate, consider the possibility of facial validations resulting from
challenges under structural provisions such as the Appointments Clause, the
Origination Clause, the Article I, section 7 requirement of bicameralism and
See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 20 at 876 (“[T]he debate regarding the availability of
facial challenges, in particular facial overbreadth challenges, is really a debate about statutory
severability—that is, whether unconstitutional text or applications of a statute should be
presumed severable or nonseverable in a given context.”) (citation omitted).
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128 See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).

A court might well not reach the merits. Cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)
(version of bill passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President constitutes
authoritative text, and courts will not look behind that text).
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presentment, or the separation of powers more generally.)130 The constitutional
existence condition example demonstrates that scholars such as Fallon, Dorf
and Metzger overstate their case when they suggest that facial challenges are
appropriate only where the court has good reason to insist that a statute be
separable. In the existence condition case, the question of separability (or
severability) would not arise.131
The second—and related—reason why the severability approach is not
fully adequate to the task of describing challenges to congressional power is
the ubiquity of valid-rule facial challenges. The existence condition challenge
hypothesized above is of course a valid-rule facial challenge. Fallon, Dorf, and
Metzger argue that a successful facial challenge always entails overcoming a
presumption against severability because they view facial challenges from the
standpoint of what Marc Isserles has called the “overbreadth assumption.”132
If one’s paradigm of a facial challenge is the overbreadth facial challenge—i.e.,
the statute is valid as applied to the claimant but must be struck down because
it is invalid in a substantial portion of its other actual or potential
applications—then interpreting Salerno as setting forth a presumption of
severability makes eminent sense. Except in the domains where overbreadth
doctrine applies, the story goes, the unprotected claimant will not get the
benefit of constitutional protections accorded to other parties not before the
Court; the statute’s application to those other parties can be invalidated, and
presumably severed, in later litigation. But in the context of a valid-rule facial
challenge, it is difficult to make sense of a “presumption of severability”: either
the statute is valid as a whole (as in the typeface example) or it is invalid as a
whole. In neither case does severability—or, indeed, the entire notion of
individual “applications”—become relevant.133
It should not come as a surprise that the facial vs. as-applied debate
cannot be reduced to a question of severability. Severability is, after all, a
matter of statutory interpretation and remedial discretion, not a matter of
constitutional law. To take an elementary illustration, a court might declare a
particular statutory subsection to be unconstitutional on its face—even under
130

See Adler & Dorf, supra note 128, at 1148.

Indeed, in a case challenging a constitutional existence condition, Fallon’s criterion
that the statute be “fully specified” at the time of adjudication (i.e., its operative legal meaning
fully determined) would also be irrelevant. The existence condition case is unusual, however,
because the meaning of the statute is irrelevant to the merits of the constitutional challenge;
typically, specification is a relevant criterion.
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Isserles, supra note 21, at 375-82.

To put it differently, severability can be relevant in identifying (and preserving)
valid subrules of otherwise invalid rules, but is of little use in identifying invalid subrules of
otherwise valid rules. I am grateful to Michael Dorf for this formulation of the point.
133

Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause

28

the exacting Salerno test—and yet sever the facially unconstitutional subsection,
allowing the remainder of the statute to stand intact.134 Conversely, a court
could conceivably invalidate a statute only “as applied” to a particular set of
circumstances, and yet conclude as a matter of statutory interpretation that the
legislature would not have intended the statute to stand unless it covered those
circumstances; the result would be, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable
from a facial invalidation.
What these examples illustrate is that the severability question and the
facial vs. as-applied review question stand on distinct grounds. Severability is a
function of (a) statutory structure and coherence, i.e., the capacity of a statute
to survive once one or more of its applications have been invalidated; (b)
legislative intent, i.e., an inquiry into whether the legislature would have wished
its handiwork to remain after some portion of it had been struck down; and (c)
institutional competency, i.e., the limits on the ability or readiness of a federal
court to reformulate a partially invalidated federal statute, or to attempt to
discern how the highest court of a state would treat or construe a partially
invalidated state statute.135 The proper mode of constitutional review, by
contrast, is a function of the applicable substantive constitutional doctrine, as
manifested in the breadth or narrowness of a court’s holding.
The same considerations reveal why the choice between facial and asapplied review will not inevitably turn on the claimant’s framing of her own
challenge. Because the proper mode of review is a function of the applicable
substantive doctrine, the parties will not always be in a position to determine
whether the court engages in as-applied or facial review. In particular, if
substantive doctrine points the court towards valid-rule facial review, it seems
unlikely that the claimant would be able to prevent the adjudication from
focusing on the language, history, and structure of the statute in comparison to
applicable constitutional requirements, rather than on facts about the
claimant’s own activities.136 Conversely, if as-applied review is called for by the
nature of the applicable substantive doctrine, the claimant cannot require the

See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down legislative veto
provision on its face but severing it from remainder of statute); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005) (facially invalidating, but severing, provision making the United States
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory in federal criminal cases).
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See generally Booker, 543 U.S. at 756-771 (opinion of Breyer, J., for the Court).

Nor is it obvious, from a strategic point of view, why a claimant would wish to
restrict herself to an as-applied challenge under such circumstances, with limited exceptions.
A case like Raich is such an exception, because a facial Commerce Clause attack on the
Controlled Substances Act was doomed to failure, and because it was not yet clear that the
Court disfavored as-applied challenges in the Commerce Clause context.
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court to entertain a facial challenge, as the Supreme Court has pointed out on
numerous occasions.137
The foregoing discussion conveys a broader lesson, namely, that there
is no rigid analytic dichotomy between as-applied and facial challenges.
Metzger rightly points out that “[t]he distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges is more illusory than the ready familiarity of the terms suggests.”138
Fallon concurs that “familiar and recurring kinds of tests illustrate how asapplied adjudication can inevitably result in facial invalidations.”139 As he
observes, “there is no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to asapplied, litigation. Rather, all challenges to statutes arise when a particular
litigant claims that a statute cannot be enforced against her.”140 Because of the
effect of stare decisis and the nature of legal reasoning, an “as-applied”
invalidation by the United States Supreme Court will usually have effects that
go far beyond the particular claimant at bar to encompass all those similarly
situated to the claimant in relevant respects. Conversely, a “facial” challenge
may attack a particular statutory title, subsection, or even a statutory phrase, on
the grounds that the challenged enactment is unconstitutional as written or
authoritatively construed. Indeed, what makes a facial challenge distinctive is
not that it challenges an entire statute, but that it challenges the targeted
enactment, however broadly or narrowly defined, as it is written and authoritatively
construed. As a leading treatise once observed, a facial challenge “puts into issue
an explicit rule of law, as formulated by the legislature or the court, and
involves the facts only insofar as it is necessary to establish that the rule served
as a basis for decision.”141 Not only are facial and as-applied challenges less
antipodal than is often assumed, but it can be argued that the overbreadth
facial challenge serves as a kind of bridge between the traditional as-applied
challenge and the valid-rule facial challenge: it shares with the former an
See Yazoo & Mississippi R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
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Metzger, supra note 20, at 880. See also Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1341
(arguing that “facial challenges are less categorically distinct from as-applied challenges than is
often thought”); Dorf, Facial Challenges, supra note 70, at 294 (arguing that “[t]he distinction
between as-applied and facial challenges may confuse more than it illuminates,” and that “[i]n
some sense, any constitutional challenge to a statute is both as-applied and facial”); see generally
Alfred Hill, Some Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 647 (2001).
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PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
FEDERAL SYSTEM 662 (3d ed. 1988). Regrettably, subsequent editions of Hart and
Wechsler’s treatise have replaced this definition of facial challenge with one based on the
misleading language of the Salerno case.
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emphasis on the facts of particular applications, and with the latter the
practical effect of an all-or-nothing disposition. In most instances, then,
whether a judicial opinion is treated as an example of “facial” or “as-applied”
review is likely to be a function of the breadth of the court’s holding, as
dictated by the applicable substantive constitutional doctrine—not a function
of severability analysis nor of the claimant’s pleading strategy.
III. RATIONALES FOR A FACIAL CHALLENGE APPROACH TO THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Although a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to ascertaining
when facial challenges are appropriate in the context of individual rights, far
less scholarly attention has been paid to that distinction in the context of the
scope of congressional power. The prominent exception is Gillian Metzger,142
whose insightful analysis largely emphasizes cases arising under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment143 and pays comparatively little attention to
Commerce Clause cases.144 Moreover, insofar as she addresses such cases,
Metzger (like Fallon and Dorf) focuses largely on whether the Court’s
Commerce Clause doctrine calls for a departure from the usual “presumption
of severability.”145 Metzger does not explore the possibility of a valid-rule
facial approach to Commerce Clause litigation.
This Part explores several possible rationales on which such an
approach might be grounded. First, however, it will be useful to survey the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause precedents to determine how the Court
has historically approached such cases. As we shall see, the Court’s Commerce
Clause cases, prior to Lopez, do not form a consistent pattern of either facial or
David Driesen has noted that the Court appears to favor facial challenges in the
Commerce Clause area, a trend that he applauds because in his view it departs from the
customary federal-court insistence on concreteness in adjudication and limits judicial
interference with the political process. See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of
Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 884 (2004). See
also Stewart, supra note 54.
142

143 Indeed, Metzger’s analysis favoring as-applied review in Section 5 cases appears to
have been implicitly adopted by the Court in United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).
On as-applied challenges and Section 5, see also Kevin S. Schwartz, Note, Applying Section 5:
Tennessee v. Lane and Judicial Conditions On The Congressional Enforcement Power, 114 YALE L. J.
1143 (2005).

See Metzger, supra note 20 at 905-13, 929-31 (discussing Commerce Clause cases
and concluding that, with the possible exception of Lopez and Morrison, they do not depart
from the ordinary presumption of severability).
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See, e.g., id. at 929 (“Perhaps most importantly, nothing in the class-of-activities
analysis under the Commerce Clause mandates a nonseverability presumption and
corresponding use of Salerno-style facial challenges.”).
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as-applied review. Since Lopez, the Court—or at least a controlling bloc of
justices on the Court—has taken a facial approach to the Commerce Clause.
A. Precedent
The 1869 case of United States v. DeWitt,146 which has been cited as the
first Supreme Court decision to strike down a federal enactment as exceeding
the Interstate Commerce power,147 is representative of the Court’s early
decisions on the subject. It is not entirely clear whether the Court in DeWitt
proceeded on a facial or as-applied basis. On the one hand, the Court
answered a certified question from a lower federal court by flatly declaring
unconstitutional Section 29 of the Internal Revenue Act, which made it a
misdemeanor to make or sell, anywhere in the United States, dangerously
combustible illuminating oils, such as those mixed with naphtha.148 On the
other hand, the Court suggested that its decision invalidated the statute only
insofar as the statute attempted to illegalize purely intrastate activity: “As a
police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the State, it can
only have effect where the legislative authority of Congress excludes,
territorially, all State legislation, as for example, in the District of Columbia.
Within State limits, it can have no constitutional operation.”149
Some early cases take a more clearly facial approach, coupling facial
invalidation with an express refusal to sever unconstitutional applications. The
Trade-Mark Cases150 provide an example. At issue were the trademark acts of
1870 and 1876, which provided for the registration of trademarks and for civil
and criminal penalties against trademark counterfeiters and infringers. The
Court first noted that the statutes lacked a jurisdictional element,151 and then
proceeded to note that the “indictments in these cases do not show that the
trade-marks which are wrongfully used were trade-marks used in [interstate]
commerce.”152 Finally, the Court refused to limit its holding to an as-applied
invalidation:
[W]hile it may be true that when one part of a statute is valid
and constitutional, and another part is unconstitutional and
146

76 U.S. 41 (1869).

147 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 597 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing DeWitt as “the first time a
Court struck down a federal law as exceeding the power conveyed by the Commerce Clause”).
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100 U.S. 82 (1879).

151 Id. at 97 (“Here is no requirement that such person shall be engaged in the kind of
commerce which Congress is authorized to regulate.”).
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void, the court may enforce the valid part where they are
distinctly separable so that each can stand alone, it is not within
the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress a
narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear in
order that crimes may be punished which are not described in
language that brings them within the constitutional power of
that body.153
Similarly, in the 1908 Employers’ Liability Cases,154 the Court facially
invalidated the original version of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
holding that by establishing a workers’ compensation scheme for all common
carriers engaged in interstate commerce, the statute “of necessity includes
subjects wholly outside of the power of Congress to regulate commerce.”155
As in the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court refused to sever invalid applications
from valid ones.156 The Court’s broad approach in the Trade-Mark Cases and
the Employers’ Liability Cases—like its identical approach in an earlier case
involving Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, upon which
the Court relied heavily in these later cases157—has been criticized by
subsequent courts and commentators.158 Other decisions, notably including
those that upheld the validity of the federal lottery trafficking statute159 and the
Mann (or White Slave) Act160 are probably best characterized as “facial
validations”: since the statutes in question expressly regulated the transport of
goods between states, they were impervious to Commerce Clause attack.161
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Id.

154

207 U.S. 463 (1908).
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Id. at 498.
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See id. at 501.
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See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876).

See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960) (singling out the TradeMark and Employers’ Liability Cases as among those “rarest of cases where this Court can
justifiably think itself able confidently to discern that Congress would not have desired its
legislation to stand at all unless it could validly stand in every application.”); DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888
(1985) at 393-95, 430 (criticizing the narrow view of severability exemplified by Reese and the
Trade-Mark Cases).
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Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.

470 (1917).
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See, e.g., Champion, 188 U.S. at 363; Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323.
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In other early cases, however, the Court appeared to proceed on an asapplied basis, although again the categorization of individual cases is not
always free from doubt. For example, in the 1881 case of Lord v. Goodall,
Nelson & Perkins Steamship Co.,162 the Court upheld, as applied to a vessel
employed exclusively in moving cargo on the Pacific Ocean between San
Francisco and San Diego, a statute limiting a vessel owner’s liability for the
loss of that vessel’s cargo. Although this would appear to be a classic asapplied validation, the Court injected an aspect of facial review into its decision
by noting that the statute contained a jurisdictional element exempting vessels
used in rivers or inland navigation, and concluding therefore that the statute
“is relieved from the objection that proved fatal to the trade-mark law which
was considered in Trade-Mark Cases. The commerce regulated is expressly
confined to a kind over which Congress has been given control.”163
Similarly, between 1899 and 1908, the Court in several cases upheld
the constitutionality of the Sherman Antitrust Act as applied to the facts or
allegations in the particular cases at bar.164 Likewise, several of the Court’s
well-known pre-New Deal Commerce Clause cases, including Southern Railway
v. United States,165 the Shreveport Rate Cases,166 and Stafford v. Wallace,167 appear to
be best characterized as as-applied validations.168
In the years immediately preceding the Court’s New Deal “switch in
time,” the Court briefly returned to an aggressive posture of facial invalidation.
Thus, in the 1935 case of Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,169 the
Court struck down the Railroad Retirement Act as unconstitutional on its face,
holding that “a pension plan thus imposed is in no proper sense a regulation of
the activity of interstate transportation. It is an attempt for social ends to
impose by sheer fiat noncontractual incidents upon the relation of employer
and employee, not as a rule or regulation of commerce and transportation
between the states, but as a means of assuring a particular class of employees

162

102 U.S. 541 (1881).

163

Id. at 544-45.

164 See Addyston Pipe & Steel v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Northern Sec. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Loewe
v. Lawlor (The Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
165

222 U.S. 20 (1911).

166

234 U.S. 342 (1914).

167

258 U.S. 495 (1922).

168

See also, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).

169

295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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against old age dependency.”170 The “sick chicken case,” A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,171 seems to facially invalidate the live poultry codes
promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act, and Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.172 seems to do the same with respect to the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act.173 None of these cases uses the language of “facial” or “asapplied” invalidation, however, and the analysis is made still more difficult by
the presence in these cases of additional grounds of invalidity, such as the nondelegation doctrine174 and the Due Process Clause.175
As is well-known, from 1937 to 1995 the Court did not invalidate a
single federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds.176 This simple fact makes
it difficult to categorize the Court’s holdings as either facial or as-applied.
Generally, the Court during this era was careful to frame its decisions,
particularly those concerning federal regulation of intrastate activity, in the
language of as-applied review.177 A prominent and oft-cited example, drawn
170 Id. at 374. The Court pointedly refused to sever invalid provisions or applications
from valid ones, stating that “as to some of the features we hold unenforceable, it is
‘unthinkable’ and ‘impossible’ that the Congress would have created the compulsory pension
system without them. They so affect the dominant aim of the whole statute as to carry it down
with them.” Id. at 362.
171

295 U.S. 495 (1935).

172

298 U.S. 238 (1936).

See id. at 315-16 (refusing to sever the price-fixing provisions of the statute from
the labor provisions, but holding instead that they fall together); but see id. at 316-17 (“If there
be in the act provisions, other than those we have considered, that may stand independently,
the question of their validity is left for future determination when, if ever, that question shall
be presented for consideration.”).
173

174

See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529-542.

175

See R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 350 (1935); Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at

311-12.
An arguable exception is Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), but
this decision is best viewed as resting on implicit, or “Tenth Amendment,” limitations on
federal power rather than on the Commerce Clause, see id. at 841 (appellants concede that
challenged statute is “undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause”), and was in any
case overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 529 (1985). Similarly,
the Court’s invalidation of a federal statute in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992),
rested on “Tenth Amendment” grounds rather than Commerce Clause grounds.
176

See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 US 1, 30 (1937) (“[W]e are not at
liberty to deny effect to specific provisions, which Congress has constitutional power to enact,
by superimposing upon them inferences from general legislative declarations of an ambiguous
character, even if found in the same statute.”); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (“We, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption
of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers is within the
power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
177
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from outside the Commerce Clause context, is the 1960 case of United States v.
Raines.178 In Raines, the government sought to enforce the Civil Rights Act of
1957 to prevent officials of the State of Georgia from denying blacks the right
to vote. The officials argued—and the district court held—that because the
statute by its terms prohibited “any person” from denying the right to vote on
the basis of race, it was susceptible of unconstitutional application (i.e.,
application to private rather than state actors) and therefore should be deemed
unconstitutional as a whole.179 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
statute was valid as applied to the state officers at bar, and declining to rule as
to its potential application to private parties.180 Similarly, in its most recent
(and extensive) discussion of the facial vs. as-applied distinction in the
congressional power context (this time in the context of the Spending Clause),
the Court has indicated that as-applied treatment is favored, and that facial
challenges, particularly those of the overbreadth variety, “are especially to be
discouraged.”181
On the other hand, the Court continued to use broad and effectively
facial reasoning in upholding direct federal regulation of the interstate
transport of goods,182 and of commerce in goods that had traveled in interstate
commerce in the past,183 and even of noncommercial activities involving goods
US 294, 305 (1964) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as here applied, we find to be plainly
appropriate in the resolution of what the Congress found to be a national commercial problem
of the first magnitude.”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146 (1971) (“The question in
this case is whether Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, as construed and applied
to petitioner [a local loan shark], is a permissible exercise by Congress of its powers under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”) (citation omitted).
178

362 U.S. 17 (1960).

179

Id. at 20.

180 Id. at 24-25; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971) (reaffirming
appropriateness of as-applied review in cases testing the scope of Congress’s power to enforce
Thirteenth Amendment and right to interstate travel); but see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214 (1875) (striking down federal statute on its face as beyond the scope of Congress’s
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power when statute contained no state action limitation).

Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). See also Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52 (1997).
181

182 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (“The power of
Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed by the constitution.’” (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)).

See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948) (upholding labeling
requirements of federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act even as applied to intrastate sale, and
“without regard to … how many intrastate sales had intervened, or who had received the
articles at the end of the interstate shipment”).
183
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that had traveled in interstate commerce in the past.184 Most importantly for
present purposes, the cumulative effect of the Court’s decisions upholding
every challenged federal regulation of local activity affecting interstate commerce
could be viewed as the functional equivalent of facial validation. Incidentally,
this cumulative effect illustrates the illusory quality of the supposed bright line
that separates facial from as-applied review: If a federal commodity price
control statute is constitutional as applied to a farmer who consumes his own
home-grown wheat,185 and a federal consumer protection statute is
constitutional as applied to a local loan shark,186 an observer could be forgiven
for concluding that no activity, however local, will be held to fall outside the
scope of the commerce power. This impression of a de facto regime of facial
validation was only reinforced by the Court’s frequent reminders that “[w]here
the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal
power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of
the class.”187 Once the Commerce Clause becomes a “Hey, you-can-dowhatever-you-feel-like Clause,”188 the distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges in the commerce power context is a purely academic matter.
Then came Lopez and Morrison. As previous commentators have
189
noted, it seems best to describe those decisions as facial invalidations. In
Lopez, the Court trains its focus almost exclusively on the terms of the Gun
Free School Zones Act, noting that the statute “by its terms has nothing to do
with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise”;190 “contains no
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that
the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce”;191 is not
accompanied by legislative findings concerning the effects of the regulated
activity on interstate commerce;192 and can be connected to interstate
184 See Scarborough v. United States, 461 U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (interpreting a federal
criminal statute to prohibit possession by convicted felons of a firearm that has traveled in or
affected interstate commerce, and strongly suggesting that Congress may regulate intrastate,
noncommercial activity involving goods that have crossed state lines).
185

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
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Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)).
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Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5
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Metzger, supra note 20 at 876; see generally Stewart, supra note 142.
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.

191

Id. at 561.
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Id. at 562.
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commerce only through an attenuated series of inferences.193 To be sure, at
the end of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court there is a brief
mention of the particular facts of the case at bar, but even then the point of
the exercise seems to be to emphasize that the statute is far removed from any
obvious matter of interstate commerce: “Respondent was a local student at a
local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have
any concrete tie to interstate commerce.”194
Morrison has a similarly facial cast. The Court begins by describing its
task as one of determining whether the civil remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act “falls within Congress’ power under Article I, § 8, of the
Constitution.”195 It then follows the methodology of Lopez, noting that
“[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity”;196 that the statute “contains no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power
to regulate interstate commerce”;197 that Congress’s findings were inadequate
to support the statute’s validity;198 and that the connection between the
conduct regulated by the statute and interstate commerce is attenuated.199
Although Lopez and Morrison do not expressly state that they are facial
challenge cases, the Court has since characterized them as such.200
This picture seems to be reversed in Raich, but only at first sight. On
the surface, Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court appears to proceed along asapplied lines. Thus, for example, the Court takes pains to note that, in explicit
contrast to Lopez and Morrison, “respondents ask us to excise individual
applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.”201 To be sure, the Court
193

Id. at 564, 567.

194

Id. at 567.

195

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
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Id. at 613.

197

Id.

198

Id. at 614-15.

199

Id. at 615-16.

200 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (“[I]n both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted
that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress’ commerce power in its entirety.”).
Another seemingly facial holding—though this time a validation rather than an invalidation—
is Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (upholding against Commerce Clause
challenge a federal statute providing evidentiary and discovery privilege in state court for
reports involving potential accident sites or hazardous roadway conditions compiled in order
to receive federal highway funds).
201

Raich, at 2209.
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assesses the statute’s validity as applied to an entire subclass of regulated
activities (i.e., “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of
cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient’s
physician pursuant to valid California state law”202) rather than as applied to
the respondents’ activities alone, but the decision still purports to limit itself to
an examination of Congress’s power to regulate that discrete subclass:
The question, however, is whether Congress’ . . . decision to
include this narrower ‘class of activities’ within the larger
regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient. We have no
difficulty concluding that Congress acted rationally in
determining that none of the characteristics making up the
purported class, whether viewed individually or in the
aggregate, compelled an exemption from the CSA; rather, the
subdivided class of activities . . . was an essential part of the
larger regulatory scheme.203
As noted above, however, Raich is best understood as a facial validation, and as
a strong signal of the Court’s rejection of an as-applied approach to
Commerce Clause review.204
A separate strain in the Court’s case law has involved the invocation of
the doctrine of saving constructions. As early as 1838, in United States v.
Coombs, the Court noted that the technique of reading statutes narrowly to
avoid constitutional questions was available in cases testing the scope of
Congress’s power.205 In Coombs, however, this discussion seems to have been
dicta. The Court appeared to uphold the challenged statute on its face,
concluding that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the requisite
authority to provide criminal sanctions for plundering even those wrecked or
distressed ships that had run aground above the high water mark and might
therefore seem beyond the reach of the federal admiralty jurisdiction.206 The
Court therefore pointedly declined to issue a narrowing construction, despite
the arguable ambiguity of the statute.207
By contrast, in the well-known 1895 case of United States v. E.C.
208
Knight, the Court used the narrowing construction technique to affirm the
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Id. at 2201.
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See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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dismissal of a suit by the United States for injunctive and equitable relief
against five sugar companies for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. After
holding that manufacturing precedes interstate commerce and is not a part of
it, the Court proceeded to construe the Sherman Act not to apply to the
activities of the sugar companies.209 Similarly, in a 1909 Commerce Clause case
the Court held that “[w]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”210
Though more common in earlier years, the saving construction method was
used during the heyday of Commerce Clause deference in a case to hold that
the jurisdictional element in a statute that made it a crime to “receive[],
possess[], or transport[] in commerce or affecting commerce [...] any firearm”
modified all the preceding elements211; and the method has been revived postLopez, to hold that a private, owner-occupied home does not qualify as
“property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate or foreign commerce” within meaning of the federal arson statute,212
and to hold that the Army Corps of Engineers’ definition of “navigable
waters” under the Clean Water Act to include intrastate waters used as habitat
by migratory birds exceeded the Corps’ statutory authority.213
This review of precedent suggests that the Court has not historically
followed a consistent pattern of either facial or as-applied adjudication in the
Commerce Clause area. The preference for facial challenges evinced by Lopez,
Morrison, and Raich appears to be a relatively new phenomenon. The
remainder of this Part explores several rationales that might explain that
preference: a formalist conception that views rights as discrete zones of
privileged conduct but envisions powers as extending to the limits of their
internally defined scope; an understanding of the Commerce Clause that views
Congress’s power under that clause as plenary, or at least judicially
unconstrained; a conception of Commerce Clause challenges as overbreadth
facial challenges; and an understanding of the Commerce Clause grounded in a
209 Id. at 10. Justice Harlan complained that the majority had offered a cramped
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, id. at 39-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and observed
that “[w]hile the opinion of the court in this case does not declare the act of 1890 to be
unconstitutional, it defeats the main object for which it was passed.” Id. at 42 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).

United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909). See also Texas v. E. Tex. R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 217 (1922).
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requirement of appropriate legislative purpose. I conclude that a controlling
bloc of justices is motivated by an understanding of the Commerce Clause’s
meaning that includes a requirement of appropriate legislative purpose, and
that this provides the soundest explanation for the Court’s movement toward
valid-rule facial review in Commerce Clause cases.
B. The formalist conception: rights as zones of privileged conduct.
It could be argued that individual rights cases in general should be
adjudicated on an as-applied basis, while cases testing the limits of federal
power in general should be adjudicated on a facial basis, on the ground that
rights-based cases entail judicial protection of zones of privileged conduct
while powers cases do not. I label this argument the formalist conception. The
formalist conception holds that constitutional rights provisions, as construed by
the Court over time, grant their holders the privilege to engage in particular
activities (speaking, confronting witnesses against them in court, obtaining
abortions without undue burdens, and so on), any law to the contrary
notwithstanding. On this view of “rights as trumps,”214 as-applied review is
especially well-suited to claims involving rights, because the individual right to
engage in particular forms of conduct authorizes a court to carve out
subclasses of exemption from the otherwise concededly valid scope of a
statutory prohibition. (See Figure 1.)
Scope of statutory
prohibition

Zones of privileged
conduct

Fig. 1

Thus, a statute generally prohibiting littering can be adjudged unconstitutional
as applied to political leafletting because the claimant has a First Amendment
right to engage in the privileged conduct of political leafletting (represented by
The vision of rights as “trumps,” sufficient to override otherwise valid regulations,
is most prominently expressed in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205
(1977). Dworkin has been described as a “sophisticated formalist.” Brian Leiter, Positivism,
Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1146 (1999).
214
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one of the white ovals in Figure 1).215 But the statute continues to be a validly
enforceable exercise of government power as applied to the broad range of
nonexpressive littering (represented by the shaded area in Figure 1).216
By contrast, on the formalist conception, constitutional powers
provisions simply extend until they exhaust their own internally defined scope.
Any limitations on the governmental authority conferred by a power-granting
provision, therefore, are already present by negative implication in the
provision’s own definition, rather than being carved out as oases of privileged
conduct. The court’s task is to adumbrate the boundary that separates
authorized from unauthorized regulation, not to excise discrete zones of
exempted conduct. (See Figure 2.)
Activities outside the scope
of federal regulatory authority

Activities within the scope
of federal regulatory authority

Fig. 2

215 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); for discussion, see Village of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
216 Three additional features of Figure 1 are worth noting. First, if the unshaded
zones were to occupy an exceptionally large proportion of the shaded area, the statute might
be struck down on its face on grounds of overbreadth, particularly if First Amendment
expressive freedoms were at stake. Second, some conduct that is unquestionably protected by
the Constitution may lie outside of a challenged statute’s prohibitory ambit. (This possibility is
represented by the white oval that straddles the boundary of the shaded area.) In cases that
present this kind of intersection between a zone of protected conduct and the outer boundary
of a statutory prohibition, courts will often invoke the classic version of the canon of
constitutional avoidance and will construe the statute not to apply to the protected conduct.
Third, zones of unquestionably protected conduct may well be surrounded by penumbras of
arguably protected conduct. (This possibility is represented by the medium-gray oval in the
upper left of the diagram.) In such cases, courts will often invoke the modern version of the
canon of constitutional avoidance and will construe the statute to apply neither to the arguably
nor to the unquestionably protected conduct. On the distinction between the “classical” and
“modern” constitutional avoidance canons, see Vermeule, Saving Constructions, supra note 73, at
1949; Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, (forthcoming 2006, on
file with author) at 13-17.
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The formalist conception makes a convenient fit with the intellectual
history of Commerce Clause precedent canvassed above in Part III.A. During
periods when the Court has adhered to a formalist vision of the Commerce
Clause, such as the immediate pre-1937 era of Alton Railroad,217 Schechter
Poultry,218 and Carter Coal,219 as well as the era inaugurated by Lopez,220 the Court
has favored a facial approach to Commerce Clause adjudication.221 By
contrast, during periods when the Court adhered to a functionalist vision of
the Commerce Clause, such as the period from 1937 to 1995, the as-applied
approach has generally predominated.222 The formalist conception perhaps
gains additional credibility from the Court’s abandonment of the “dual
federalism” model of federal and state power.223 The Court’s decision, in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,224 to repudiate its short-lived
effort at defining unregulable spheres of traditional State governmental activity
suggests that the model of federalism as marking out spheres of conduct
immune from federal regulation is obsolete.225 Rather, the federal government,
as Chief Justice Marshall put it in McCullough v. Maryland, “though limited in its
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”226
This formalist argument for presumptively facial review in cases
challenging the scope of congressional power has considerable intuitive
217
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See supra notes 169-175, 189-200.
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See supra notes 176-188.

223 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 808 n.6, and § 5-11, at 862-77 (3d ed. 2000);
BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE §§ 4.03, 6.02[C], 6.03 (1999). See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE
POWER AND STATES’ RIGHTS 115-172 (1936).

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling Nat’l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
224

225 Some recent statements from the Court, however, indicate that the vision of dual
federalism may not be entirely dead. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (O’Connor, J., opinion
of the Court); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court)
(invoking “historical understanding and practice[,] the structure of the Constitution, and …
the jurisprudence of this Court” in striking down the Brady Act on anti-commandeering
grounds).
226
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appeal—and, if accepted, would suggest the appropriateness of facial review in
cases involving all heads of federal authority, including but not limited to the
Commerce Clause.227 However, the argument ultimately proves unconvincing,
for two reasons.
First, as the discussion in Part II of valid-rule facial challenges
demonstrates, the argument dramatically misdescribes the constitutional law of
individual rights. Individual rights are not invariably, or even usually, defined
in terms of zones of privileged conduct. Indeed, relatively few constitutional
rights have been interpreted to create a sphere of conduct that is immune to
government regulation.228 Rather, in most areas of constitutional law, from the
First Amendment to the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Establishment
Clauses, the Court has made clear that even successful litigants cannot protect
their conduct behind a shield of constitutional impunity. Conduct which
cannot be validly regulated in a given instance by Statute A could be validly
regulated by Statute B. What matters in most cases is the nature of the
regulation: Statute B may be appropriately precise where Statute A was
unconstitutionally vague; Statute B may be evenhanded where Statute A was
impermissibly underinclusive; Statute B may be neutral in its purpose where
Statute A was motivated by illegitimate legislative animus, and so on. This is
why, as discussed in Part II, facial review in individual rights cases is far more
common than is conventionally recognized.229 Indeed, some statutes, such as
those motivated by an illegitimate purpose, are vulnerable to being struck
down on their face under valid-rule facial review. In such instances, at least,
Matthew Adler is correct that constitutional rights under the American system
of judicial review are “rights against rules.”230
227 Cf. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“When a litigant claims that legislation has denied him individual rights secured by
the Constitution, the court ordinarily asks first whether the legislation is constitutional as
applied to him. When, on the other hand, a federal statute is challenged as going beyond
Congress’s enumerated powers, under our precedents the court first asks whether the statute is
unconstitutional on its face.”) (citations omitted).

See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729-30 (“Rights are not general trumps against
appeals to the common good or anything else; instead, they are better understood as
channelling the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas.
Moreover, this is not an exceptional doctrine for aberrational contexts but a pervasive feature
of many constitutional rights.”).
228
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See supra Part II.B.

230 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 95. Adler’s argument is rich and
complex, and this article does not take a position on his larger claims, or those raised in
opposition by Richard Fallon. For their colloquy, see Fallon’s paper, As-Applied, supra note 95,
to which Adler replied in the same issue of the Harvard Law Review: Matthew D. Adler,
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This is not to say that zones of privileged activity do not play an
important role in constitutional law. Some rights, as Michael Dorf has put it,
really are “rights simpliciter.”231 A particularly unambiguous example is the right
not to be enslaved, enshrined in the Thirteenth Amendment.232 Any statute or
other government action—or indeed any private action—that results in
involuntary servitude is to that extent unconstitutional, and a court’s judgment
so declaring is likely to take on an “as-applied” cast.233 Similarly, rights against
executive enforcement action or fundamental unfairness in the judicial process
are often best characterized as rights to a sphere of privileged conduct: the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right not to be tortured are good
examples. Additionally, the Court has arguably carved out some rights
simpliciter in the area of fundamental rights of private autonomy and free
expression, areas which are accordingly characterized by an as-applied or an
overbreadth mode of review. When such rights are at stake, the reviewing
court is typically called upon to identify a logical subclass of regulated activities
and determine whether that subclass must be exempted from regulation, either
via constitutional invalidation plus severance or via narrowed statutory
construction. 234
This explains why, in the famous case of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., the Court upheld a federal regulatory statute against facial challenge but
went on “recognize that the constitutionality of a statute, valid on its face, may
be assailed by proof of facts tending to show that the statute as applied to a
particular article is without support in reason… .”235 While this passage, read
out of context, could be taken to assert that the Court was willing to entertain
claims arguing that a particular application of a federal statute lies beyond the
Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1371 (2000).
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Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 102, at 270.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.

233 Not inevitably, though—a statute that declared “All Republicans are hereby
declared slaves of Democrats” would surely be judged invalid on its face, under both the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
234 Of course, even fundamental rights can be validly abridged when the government
can demonstrate that such abridgment is a narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. Though an analysis of the proper mode of adjudication in fundamental
rights cases lies beyond the scope of this article, it can be argued that the narrow tailoring
prong of strict scrutiny calls for a kind of overbreadth review. See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 21,
at 416-17 (noting that the Court “has suggested that ‘overbreadth’ and ‘narrow tailoring’ are
different expressions for precisely the same constitutional defect.”).
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outer bounds of federal power, in fact it occurs during a part of the opinion
dealing with the claimant’s Fifth Amendment Due Process argument.236 It is
thus sounder to read this passage as leaving open the possibility that particular
applications might be subject to an as-applied, Due Process–based challenge.
By the same token, the Supreme Court in Raich remanded the case to the lower
courts for adjudication of the medical marijuana users’ substantive due process
claim, which would indeed be addressed on an as-applied basis. 237
The notion of rights as shields for privileged conduct fails to provide a
sound basis for differential treatment of rights claims and powers claims for a
second, complementary reason. Even if one accepts the vision described by
Figure 2, and envisions federal power as extending until it exhausts its
internally defined scope, it does not follow that as-applied review is
inappropriate in the context of a challenge to the scope of federal power. This
can be seen by examining Figure 3, which superimposes onto Figure 2 a
medium-gray oval representing the scope of activities prohibited by a federal
regulatory statute as authoritatively construed.
Activities outside the scope of
federal regulatory authority

Activities within the scope of
federal regulatory authority
x
Scope of statutory
prohibition

Fig. 3

y

Even if the federal court’s principal task is to determine the boundary
of permissible federal authority, there is no compelling reason in theory or
practice why it could not perform this task through a series of as-applied
adjudications. The Court could invalidate statutes insofar as, but only insofar
as, they purport to regulate activities that fall outside the scope of the relevant
enumerated power. Thus, for example, a court in Case 1 could adjudicate the
236
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federal statute represented in Figure 3 to be valid as applied to the activity
represented by the letter x, but in Case 2 could adjudicate it to be invalid as
applied to the activity represented by the letter y. This, after all, was the
approach proposed by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Raich. 238
In short, the formalist conception of rights as shields for privileged
conduct cannot serve as the rationale for an across-the-board distinction
between the proper mode of judicial analysis in rights cases as opposed to
powers cases. Both rights claims and powers claims are, to borrow Dorf’s
term, “heterogeneous”—they can and should be framed in either facial or asapplied terms, depending on the interaction between the challenged statute
and the underlying substantive constitutional doctrine.239
C. The commerce power as plenary or judicially unconstrained.
The simplest way to justify a facial approach to Commerce Clause
cases would be to posit that federal regulatory power in the age of the globally
interconnected economy has effectively become plenary. Or, more sensibly—
at least from the standpoint of a theory of judicial review that takes
comparative institutional capacity seriously240—one could argue that limits on
the commerce power ought not to be judicially enforceable. This latter view
was expressed by Herbert Wechsler in his celebrated (though often criticized)
article on “The Political Safeguards of Federalism,” and other scholars who

Cf. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“A number of objective
markers are available to confine the scope of constitutional review here. Both federal and
state legislation . . . recognize that medical and nonmedical . . . uses of drugs are realistically
distinct and can be segregated, and regulate them differently. . . . Respondents challenge only
the application of the CSA to medicinal use of marijuana.”).
238

239 As a descriptive matter, one might add that the formalist conception’s sharp
divide between rights-based claims and power-based claims stands in tension with the Court’s
repeated insistence that the system of federalism is ultimately designed to enhance individual
freedom. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (“the Framers crafted the federal system of
Government so that the people’s rights would be secured by the division of power”); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals”); Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (“The ‘constitutionally mandated balance of power’ between
the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection
of ‘our fundamental liberties’.”) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting)). The
formalist conception is not flatly inconsistent with these statements, however. Judicially
enforced federalism could serve indirectly to enhance individual freedom without marking off
discrete zones of protected conduct.

See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101
MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that legal interpretation should be guided by considerations
of institutional capacity and institutional incentives).
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have followed in Wechsler’s footsteps.241 On this view, the distinction
between facial and as-applied review in Commerce Clause cases would vanish:
no Commerce Clause claimant would prevail in court, no matter how his claim
was characterized. A court that forthrightly adopted such an approach would
perhaps best be described as engaging in facial validation, as described earlier:
not only does the particular claimant at bar have no valid constitutional claim,
but neither does any other actual or potential claimant.242 Indeed, in its
strongest form, this approach could render Commerce Clause arguments
effectively nonjusticiable.243
This was the approach that held sway on the Court between 1937 and
1995, in terms of outcomes if not in terms of rationale. And it is quite
possible that this view, or something like it, continues to be held by the bloc of
four justices who dissented in Lopez, Morrison, and several other recent
federalism cases: Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.244 To be sure,
these justices are sometimes willing to construe federal statutes narrowly in
light of federalism concerns,245 or to sign on to opinions that use clear
statement rules in an effort to focus the attention of the political branches on

241 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). Cf. Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (adopting the political
safeguards of federalism view, at least with regard to the question whether Congress may
regulate the States in the exercise of traditional governmental functions: “Any rule of state
immunity that looks to the ‘traditional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental
functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes”). For critiques of the Wechsler approach, see
Frank Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304 (1999); John O. McGinnis and
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense Of Judicial Review In A Federal System, NW. U. L.
REV. 89 (2004); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9: “Professor Wechsler, whose seminal article in 1954
proposed the view adopted by the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions that
simply do not accord with current reality.” (Powell, J., dissenting).
242

See supra text accompanying notes 127-128.
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See Choper, supra note 241, at 175.

See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The commerce power, we
have often observed, is plenary.”); id. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76-101 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 648-65 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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245 See, e.g., Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Jones, 529
U.S. 848 (2000).
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the traditional prerogatives of the States,246 but they appear unlikely to vote to
strike down any plausibly rational federal statute on Commerce Clause
grounds, either facially or as applied.
These justices, however, do not command a majority on the current
Court. To the contrary, the five-justice majority in Lopez emphatically stated
that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that
would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,”247 and refused to
conclude “that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose
something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local.”248 In the same spirit, the Court
rejected the government’s assertion that gun possession near schools affects
interstate commerce by noting that “if we were to accept the Government’s
arguments, we [would be] hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate.”249 Likewise, in Morrison, the Court
reaffirmed that “even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective
bounds.”250 What’s more, the Court went out of its way to make clear that
these “bounds” were meant to be judicially enforceable, asserting that “[u]nder
our written Constitution, … the limitation of congressional authority is not
solely a matter of legislative grace.”251
A view of the interstate commerce power as plenary or judicially
unconstrained may well provide the best explanation for the decision of the
four Lopez/Morrison dissenters to join the majority in Raich. But to explain
fully the pattern of outcomes on the current Court, we must attempt to
understand the approach taken by other justices, particularly those who were
part of the majority in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Justices Scalia and
Kennedy.252 The basis for these justices’ apparent preference for facial review
in Commerce Clause must be sought in some other rationale.
Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney General to prohibit the use of federally
scheduled drugs to perform assisted suicide, in part because “the background principles of our
federal system … belie the notion that Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority
to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the States’ police power”).
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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Id. (citations omitted).
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Id. at 564.
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Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
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Id. at 616.

The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, the retired Justice O’Connor, and Justice
Thomas were all willing to entertain an as-applied challenge in Raich. It is too early to predict
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D. Commerce Clause review as overbreadth review.
Perhaps what looks like facial adjudication in the Commerce Clause
area is really just a version of traditional overbreadth review. On this view,
when the Court facially invalidates statutes as exceeding the commerce
power—even when the claimant’s activity itself is federally regulable—it does
so because an unacceptably large proportion of the activities regulated by the
challenged statute lies beyond the reach of that power.
The idea that existing Commerce Clause doctrine incorporates an
overbreadth component has some appeal.253 By embracing such an idea, one
could concede that much of the Court’s recent jurisprudence (e.g., Lopez and
Morrison) has a facial cast, while denying that the Court has entertained validrule facial challenges in this area. One might argue, for example, that the
Court never asked whether Alfonzo Lopez’s gun had traveled in interstate
commerce because, even if his particular transaction was regulable, an
unacceptably large proportion of the transactions covered by the Gun-Free
School Zones Act were not. By the same token, it could be argued, even if
some acts of gender-based violence involve interstate travel or substantially
affect interstate commerce, the outcome in Morrison was grounded in the
judgment that the large majority of assaults on women have no such nexus to
interstate commerce. Moreover, the Court’s emphasis of late on the curative
powers of statutory jurisdictional elements dovetails nicely with an
overbreadth conception of Commerce Clause: the jurisdictional element
ensures that the scope of federal regulation is precisely coterminous with the
class of validly regulable activities.
An overbreadth conception of Commerce Clause review gains some
additional plausibility from the Court’s recent cases involving Congress’s
enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the
1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court embarked on a new approach to
determining whether federal legislation is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section
5 authority “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment].”254 Such legislation, the Court held, may remedy or
prevent conduct that does not itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but
the approach of Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito, but even if their views were to track
those of their predecessors, there does not appear to be a majority on the Court in favor of asapplied review in Commerce Clause cases.
As early as Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the Supreme Court confronted
the question of overbreadth in the context of a challenge to state legislative power. Id. at 102.
The Court, however, did not directly endorse this contention, choosing instead to strike down
the New York statute on its face as incompatible with federal statute law under the Supremacy
Clause.
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may not alter the substantive content of constitutional rights.255 To implement
this new approach, the Court announced a new doctrinal test: “There must be
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”256 The Court soon set about
applying this “congruence and proportionality” test to invalidate several
federal statutes (and statutory provisions purporting to abrogate state
sovereign immunity).257 These were facial invalidations: the Court did not look
to the particular facts of the claimant’s case, but proceeded by identifying the
constitutional right Congress sought to enforce, determining whether
Congress had assembled a record detailing a pattern of state violations of the
right, and then determining whether the challenged statute was a congruent
and proportional response to that pattern.258
The congruence and proportionality test does not lend itself to easy or
precise categorization, but it seems best to view it as a species of narrow
tailoring or overbreadth test.259 Thus, for example, in Boerne the Court stated
that “[p]reventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be
appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by
the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional,”260 and that in light of this requirement, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act’s “sweeping coverage” doomed it to facial
invalidation.261 This reasoning was repeated in subsequent cases, as the Court
255

Id. at 518-19.
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Id. at 520.

257 See id. at 529-36 (applying the congruence and proportionality test to invalidate
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to state and local government action); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating
provision of Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating provision of
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(invalidating provision of Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 61927 (invalidating civil remedy provision of VAWA); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(invalidating provision of Americans with Disabilities Act).
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See Metzger, supra note 20, at 875.

259 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10 (characterizing Boerne as an overbreadth case);
Metzger, supra note 20, at 917 (“The fact that the test represents a form of narrow tailoring
may justify deviating from the presumption of severability at least insofar as to require courts
to entertain what are in essence facial overbreadth challenges.”); Catherine Carroll, Note, Section
Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach to Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
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invalidated the Patent Remedy Act in light of its “indiscriminate scope,”262 held
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “prohibits substantially more
state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard,”263 and concluded that the duty of reasonable accommodation under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) “far exceeds what is
constitutionally required.”264 The Court took a facial approach even in its 2003
decision upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act, paying no heed to the
specific facts of the case at bar and concluding that the Act’s remedy—though
“prophylactic,” i.e., broader than the underlying constitutional violation—did
not sweep so broadly as to exceed Congress’s Section 5 authority.265 To be
sure, the overbreadth model of Section 5 adjudication has a more difficult time
accounting for the Court’s more recent decisions in Tennessee v. Lane266 and
United States v. Georgia,267 which upheld Title II of the ADA as applied. Even
these decisions, however, can be squared with the overbreadth model—so
long as we make the assumption, as the Court apparently did in Lane, that
federal legislation may be divided for purposes of Section 5 review into
“subrules” that are differentiated by the constitutional right each subrule
purports to enforce and then tested for overbreadth on a subrule-by-subrule
basis.268
To make the overbreadth approach to Commerce Clause adjudication
maximally plausible, imagine a federal statute that simply criminalizes murder.
Imagine further that a federal poultry inspector has been killed in the line of
duty, and that the killer is charged with violating the general federal murder
statute. Congress undoubtedly has the power under the Necessary and Proper
262

Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647.
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Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
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Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.

Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-40 (2003); cf. Metzger,
supra note 20, at 896-97 (concluding that Hibbs has a facial cast, though denying that the
Court’s cases preclude as-applied treatment of Section 5 challenges).
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541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).

268 541 U.S. at 530 & n.18 (asserting that the Title II of the ADA need not be
considered “as an undifferentiated whole,” but rather that its validity may be assessed insofar
as it purports to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts); see also Georgia, 126 S.
Ct. at 882 (emphasizing that Title II is valid insofar as it creates a remedy “for conduct that
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment”) (emphasis in original); cf. Fallon, As-Applied,
supra note 95, at 1357-58. But see Metzger, supra note 20, at 897 n.114 (dismissing the Court’s
attempt in Lane to distinguish its facial-review precedents as “not particularly persuasive”).
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Clause to protect federal officials in the discharge of their duties by imposing
criminal penalties on those who kill them.269 Yet, on the strength of Lopez and
Morrison, it seems virtually certain that our hypothetical defendant could
successfully challenge the facial validity of the general federal murder statute,
notwithstanding the fact that he happened to commit a crime that could have
been regulated by a more narrowly drawn law. 270
While an overbreadth understanding of the Commerce Clause is
theoretically conceivable, it is hard to maintain that such an understanding
provides the soundest explanation for the facial character of the Court’s recent
decisions. Lopez and Morrison simply do not read like overbreadth cases. The
Court in Lopez makes absolutely no inquiry into whether a substantial
proportion of the guns carried near schools have traveled in interstate
commerce; the Court in Morrison pays no attention to whether a substantial
proportion of violent acts against women affect interstate commerce. The
overbreadth characterization is particularly far-fetched with respect to Lopez,
since the large majority of guns do in fact travel in interstate commerce, a fact
which presumably would have been enough to doom any overbreadth
Cf. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, which
is not a general murder statute, does seem to contemplate treating the killing of a federal
agency investigator as an aggravating factor in federal death penalty cases. See 18
U. S. C. § 3592(c)(14)(D)(iii); John P. Cunningham, Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations and
Realities of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 956 (1998) (noting that
some Members of Congress criticized the inclusion in the 1994 Act of crimes such as murder
of a federal poultry inspector).
269

Interestingly, Justice Scalia came to the same conclusion, albeit in a slightly
different context (a challenge asserting that an administrative agency regulation was facially
inconsistent with its enabling statute). His discussion is worth quoting at some length:
270

It is one thing to say that a facial challenge to a regulation that omits statutory
element x must be rejected if there is any set of facts on which the statute does not
require x. It is something quite different—and unlike any doctrine of “facial
challenge” I have ever encountered—to say that the challenge must be rejected if the
regulation could be applied to a state of facts in which element x happens to be
present. On this analysis, the only regulation susceptible to facial attack is one that
not only is invalid in all its applications, but also does not sweep up any person who
could have been held liable under a proper application of the statute. That is not the
law. Suppose a statute that prohibits “premeditated killing of a human being,” and an
implementing regulation that prohibits “killing a human being.” A facial challenge to
the regulation would not be rejected on the ground that, after all, it could be applied
to a killing that happened to be premeditated. It could not be applied to such a
killing, because it does not require the factfinder to find premeditation, as the statute
requires.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 731-32 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). For an illuminating discussion of facial challenges to the validity of regulations
vis-à-vis authorizing statutes, see Buck, supra note 21.
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challenge in that case.271 The problem with such statutes, in the view of the
Court majority, is that they are simply not the kind of law that the Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to enact. Even our hypothetical federal murder
statute, though almost certainly invalid under Lopez and Morrison, would be
invalid not because it would sweep too broadly in its applications, but because
the Court would not deem a prohibition of murder to be the kind of law that
counts as a regulation of interstate commerce.272 Conversely, the claimants in
Raich may have demonstrated that their activities, taken alone, could not be
made the subject of a narrow, single-subject federal prohibition, but they
rightly did not argue that the statute as a whole was unduly overbroad.273 On
the contrary, the breadth of the Controlled Substances Act turned out to be
what saved it from invalidation; as Justice O’Connor suggested in her dissent,
judging from the Court’s analysis in Raich, the constitutional flaw in the
statutes that were struck down in Lopez and Morrison was one of
“underbreadth,” not overbreadth.274 In short, the Court approaches the
Commerce Clause from the perspective not of the overbreadth facial challenge
but of the valid-rule facial challenge. The next Subpart explains why.
E. The Commerce Clause and the requirement of appropriate
legislative purpose.
Ultimately, a judicial concern with legislative purpose provides the
most plausible explanation of the facial character of the Court’s recent
Commerce Clause cases. To be sure, in the Commerce Clause context, inquiry
into legislative purpose is not prominent on the surface of the Court’s
doctrine. Instead, that inquiry—more specifically, a judicial concern with the
271

See supra note 58.

272 Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 428, 443 (1821) (casting doubt on the notion
that Congress has general authority to punish felonies, particularly murder, within the states);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (2000) (same).
273 In addition, if Commerce Clause overbreadth review existed, and the Court
applied its threshold rule from First Amendment overbreadth cases, the Raich claimants would
not be permitted simultaneously to argue that their own conduct was constitutionally
unregulable by Congress and that the statute as a whole was unduly overbroad. See Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985).

See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court announces a
rule that gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce
Clause—nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory
schemes—rather than with precision.”). See generally Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause
Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325 (2001) [hereinafter Vermeule, Perverse Effects]
(arguing that the Court’s emerging Commerce Clause jurisprudence disserves the values of
federalism by encouraging broad federal regulation). I am grateful to Jonathan Masur for
alerting me to the “underbreadth” coinage. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., concurring)
(accusing the majority of inventing a doctrine of “underbreadth”).
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ends or aims of the challenged statute as a whole—lies beneath the doctrinal
surface, informing the Court’s reasoning and guiding the Court toward facial
dispositions in Commerce Clause cases, validations and invalidations alike.
All first-year Constitutional Law students learn that the possibility of a
purpose-based approach to congressional power was outlined by Chief Justice
Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland: “[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of
exercising its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the government[,] it would become the painful duty of this
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that
such an act was not the law of the land.”275 Yet those students soon learn that
the prohibition on pretextual Commerce Clause legislation, having been
abused by a conservative Supreme Court in cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart,276
was decisively put to rest in the 1941 case of United States v. Darby.277 The
Darby Court could hardly have been more definitive: “The motive and purpose
of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment
upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
which the courts are given no control.”278
Moreover, the Court’s rejection of a purpose-based approach to
Commerce Clause doctrine is consistent with a long tradition of judicial
skepticism about inquiring into legislative motivation in constitutional cases.
As long ago as Fletcher v. Peck in 1810, Chief Justice Marshall warned of the
difficulties entailed by judicial investigation of legislative motivation,279 and the
Court has since echoed that warning countless times.280 The pitfalls of such an
approach are by now familiar. First, determining the subjective motivations
275

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).

276 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a statute prohibiting the interstate transport of
goods produced using child labor, on the ground that the purpose of the statute was to affect
the terms and conditions of labor in manufacturing, a subject then deemed outside the scope
of interstate commerce).
277

312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Id. at 115.

279 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810) (“It may well be doubted how far the validity of
a law depends upon the motives of its framers, and how far the particular inducements,
operating on members of the supreme sovereign power of a state, to the formation of a
contract by that power, are examinable in a court of justice.”).
280 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (“[I]t is extremely difficult
for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a
legislative enactment.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a familiar
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S.
423, 454-55 (1931).
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that impelled a legislator to vote for a particular bill is virtually an impossible
task.281 Second, legislatures are multi-member bodies, so even if a court could
somehow ascertain the intention of each legislator, aggregating those manifold
intentions into a single “legislative intent” would amount to a fool’s errand.282
And third, as John Hart Ely powerfully argued, the search for legislative
motivation can exacerbate the risk that judges will simply second-guess the
legislature’s choices and substitute their own preferences for those of the
political branches.283 Though some scholars in recent years have argued that
judicial inquiry into legislative motivation is both more common as a
descriptive matter and more desirable as a normative matter than the standard
critique would suggest,284 the critique remains a serious one.
It is not sufficient to derail us here, however, for three reasons. First,
the primary burden of this article is to explain, not to justify or defend, the
Court’s recent turn toward facial review in Commerce Clause cases. That a
judicial inquiry into legislative purpose may be chimerical or unwise does not
disqualify it as a positive account of the Court’s preference for facial review if
other factors suggest it has explanatory force. Second, the critique of judicial
281 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[D]iscerning the subjective motivation of those enacting [a] statute is, to be honest, almost
always an impossible task.”)
282 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a
collective body.”); cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977) (“[I]t is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with
balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of
their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.”).

See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1214 (1970) (asserting that “only a hopelessly result-oriented judge would be
able to assert that he knew which was ‘the’ motivation or the ‘dominant’ motivation underlying
the [anti-draft-card-burning] statute” challenged in United States v. O’Brien). Ely also argued
that constitutional invalidation on grounds of improper legislative motivation is often futile,
because the legislature can respond to such an invalidation by simply re-enacting the same
statute accompanied by different—or, worse, less candid—statements of purpose. Id. at 121415.
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See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 297 (1997) (welcoming the Court’s trend toward increased scrutiny of governmental
purposes and offering a framework for such scrutiny); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing:
The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994) (arguing for a
structural conception of rights in which examination of the government’s reasons for acting
would become more prominent); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution,
111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 72 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword] (“[I]nquiries into purpose are
familiar in constitutional law, as they are in the moral assessment of human conduct. In many
if not most cases, the relevant questions seem entirely straightforward.”).
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inquiry into legislative motivation gains much of its strength from the
observation that it is rarely possible to ascribe a single, or even dominant,
intention to a particular statute.285 But this article does not assert that the
Court understands the Commerce Clause to impose a requirement of sole or
primary legislative purpose, only that (broadly speaking) the challenged statute
have some reasonably plausible commercial purpose. Third, and most
important, it is crucial to distinguish between the search for subjective
legislative motivations (which is indeed highly vulnerable to the critique
described above) and the more objective quest for legislative purposes, in the
sense of the aims or goals at which statutes are directed.286 The latter inquiry,
though not without its own perils, presents a far more familiar and manageable
task for judges287—and it is the latter that appears to be at work beneath the
surface of the Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases.
To be more specific, decisions from Lopez onward suggest that the
Court views the Constitution as imposing something like the following
requirement: A statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority must have, as one of its reasonably plausible aims, a purpose to
directly regulate or substantially affect interstate commerce.288
See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and
Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1235 (2003) (“[L]aws tend
to have purposes, not a purpose, and to reflect compromises.”).
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The discussion here parallels that of Gil Seinfeld’s interesting article, The Possibility
of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1302-03
(2003), with an important divergence: Seinfeld advocates judicial inquiry into legislative
purpose in Commerce Clause cases as a normatively attractive road not taken, whereas this
article asserts as a descriptive matter that a concern with legislative purpose, while not
prominent on the surface of the Court’s doctrine, has already driven the Court toward facial
review.
286

287 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1410-17 (tent. ed. 1958) (advocating
an influential method of statutory interpretation in which courts determine the objective
purpose of a statute by examining its text, structure, and history in light of the assumption that
statutes are the product of reasonable legislators acting reasonably); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute[,] i.e., the
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed.”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (“[W]here,
as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive, and
hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, … a ‘balancing’ analysis is
inappropriate.”); cf. Fallon, Foreword, supra note 284, at 71-73 (distinguishing between “purpose
tests” and “aim tests” in constitutional doctrine); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists
From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 71-72 (2006) (describing purpose-based approach
to statutory interpretation).
288 Two notes about this admittedly broad-brush sketch of the Court’s likely
understanding of the Commerce Clause. First, by “the Court” here I mean the controlling
bloc of Justices in Lopez and Morrison, particularly Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who tilted the
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Traces of such an understanding are reflected in several facets of the
Court’s recent Commerce Clause doctrine. First, the Lopez Court attempted to
distinguish Wickard v. Filburn by noting that “[o]ne of the primary purposes” of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act challenged in Wickard was to stabilize the
interstate market in wheat by limiting output and increasing price.289 In
contrast, said the Court, the Gun-Free School Zones Act “is a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”290 Similarly, in a
passage of his Lopez concurrence subsequently quoted by the Court in
Morrison, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “unlike the earlier cases to come
before the Court[,] here neither the actors nor their conduct has a commercial
character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident
commercial nexus.”291 Second, the Court’s emphasis in Lopez, and to a lesser
extent in Morrison, on the role of legislative findings concerning the effects of a
federally regulated activity on interstate commerce reinforces the conclusion
that a concern with legislative purpose is at work in the Court’s thinking.292
After all, requiring (or at least strongly encouraging) the legislature to articulate
the connection between its handiwork and interstate commerce is a fairly
dependable way for a court to ascertain whether the statute as a whole was
designed, at least in part, to “get at” economic activities or effects.293 Third,
perhaps the best evidence that the Court is motivated by an underlying
concern with legislative purpose is the fact that it adjudicates Commerce
Clause cases as valid-rule facial challenges. As noted in Part II, valid-rule facial
challenges are particularly prominent in areas of constitutional law where
substantive judicial doctrine directs courts to undertake an examination of
legislative purpose.294
balance toward facial validation in Raich. As discussed supra, text accompanying notes 244246, the four Lopez/Morrison dissenters probably view the commerce power as plenary or
judicially unconstrained, and it is too early to pinpoint the views of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito. Second, the phrase “reasonably plausible aims” is meant to exclude commercial
purposes that are far-fetched or attenuated, such as the government’s theories in Lopez, which
the Court rejected as requiring the piling of “inference upon inference,” 514 U.S. at 567. A
statute’s reasonably plausible aim need not be its sole or primary aim.
289

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128).
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Id.

291

Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

292

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.

Cf. Seinfeld, supra note 286, at 1324-27 (2003) (advocating a requirement of
congressional findings concerning the commercial purposes served by a statute as a
normatively attractive way for courts to ensure compliance with the Commerce Clause).
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294

See supra text accompanying note 115.
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The apparent renewal of interest among the justices in legislative
purpose under the Commerce Clause has not gone unnoticed. For example,
Mitchell Berman suggests that the results in Lopez, Morrison, and the littlenoticed case of Pierce County v. Guillen295—one might now add Raich to this
list—are consistent with an understanding on the part of the Court’s
federalism-minded justices that Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity must be motivated, at least in part, by commercial purposes.296 Other
scholars have advanced similar views.297
Yet this article’s primary claim is not that a concern with legislative
purpose is conspicuous on the surface of the Court’s decisions, but rather that
such a concern operates beneath the surface of, and helps shape, those
decisions. The important and by-now-familiar distinction here is between
constitutional meaning on the one hand and the doctrine used by courts to
implement that meaning on the other.298 To say that a majority of justices
harbor an understanding of the meaning of the Commerce Clause that
incorporates a requirement of commercial purpose is not to say that judicial
doctrine will, or should, incorporate that requirement. There may be very
good reasons—institutional, evidentiary, or otherwise—to eschew direct
judicial enforcement of that component of the Clause’s meaning.299 Thus, as
Berman has argued, although the concept of commercial purpose has not
295

537 U.S. 129 (2003).

296 See Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1511-19 (1994) [hereinafter Berman, Gullibility].

See, e.g., Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1229 (“Recent Commerce Clause
cases … demonstrate a renewed interest in legislative purpose.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, On
Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90 Geo. L. J. 2143, 2163 (“[W]hat seems to matter primarily
to the Court for purposes of demarcating the scope of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause is the law’s objective, rather than the means by which this objective is
achieved.”); cf. Bhagwat, supra note 284, at 310 n.43 (speculating “that Congress’ lack of
commercial motivation was relevant to the Court’s conclusion” in Lopez).
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There is a voluminous and growing literature on this topic. For some important
examples, see, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988); Fallon, Foreword, supra note 285; Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943 (2003); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Decision Rules]; Kermit Roosevelt
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2005).
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299 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 279-284 (describing critique of direct judicial
inquiry into legislative motivation).
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featured especially prominently in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine
(what Berman calls the Court’s “decision rules”) it plays a large role in the
federalism-minded justices’ understanding of the meaning of the Commerce
Clause (what Berman calls the “constitutional operative proposition”).300
An analogy can be made here to two other areas of constitutional law:
the Dormant Commerce Clause and the First Amendment. In both of these
areas, scholars have persuasively argued that the Court’s understanding of the
relevant constitutional operative provision incorporates a latent or inchoate
requirement of appropriate legislative purpose. Yet in each area, the Court has
crafted judicial doctrines that sidestep direct inquiry into the purposes
underlying the challenged statute.
With respect to the Dormant Commerce Clause, Donald Regan has
argued that the Court’s decisions, particularly in cases challenging state statutes
that restrict the movement of goods across state lines, are best explained by a
principle that outlaws legislation enacted with an impermissible purpose.301 In
Dormant Commerce Clause cases, this forbidden legislative purpose is
protectionism, i.e., the desire to improve the competitive position of in-state as
compared to out-of-state economic actors.302 Regan argues that the doctrinal
tests used by the Court in this area—including per se rules, presumptions,
undue burden analyses, and other tests that appear to turn on a balancing of
interests or effects rather than on a search for legislative motive—are in fact
best explained by the effort to root out and invalidate statutes enacted for
protectionist reasons.303 He concludes that the Court sometimes uses nonpurpose-based doctrines, such as balancing tests, as a convenient cover for a
purpose inquiry, either because the justices are aware of the practical
See, e.g., Berman, Gullibility, supra note 296, at 1512 (speculating that “a majority of
the Supreme Court believes (perhaps inchoately) that the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate intrastate behavior only in order to achieve what I will loosely call
‘commercial purposes’—a family of ends including, most centrally, promoting economic
growth and also (perhaps) ameliorating the negative externalities that economic growth
produces”). For a full exposition and defense of the distinction between constitutional
“operative propositions” and doctrinal “decision rules,” see Berman, Decision Rules, supra note
298; Roosevelt, supra note 298.
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Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). I am grateful to Brad Joondeph for
calling the Dormant Commerce Clause parallel to my attention.
301

302

Id. at 1094-95.

Id. at 1206-84. Since the publication of Regan’s article, the Court has become
more forthright in its use of purposive analysis in Dormant Commerce Clause cases. See, e.g.,
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 n.12 (1997) (citing Regan’s article and noting
that “several cases that have purported to apply the undue burden test … arguably turned in
whole or in part on the discriminatory character of the challenged state regulations”).
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difficulties of purpose inquiries, because they have expressly disavowed such
inquiries in the past, or because they do not wish to accuse state officials of
harboring improper motives.304
Similarly, Elena Kagan has argued that much of First Amendment law,
though not explicitly framed in terms of purpose, is designed to identify and
invalidate laws that are in fact motivated by impermissible governmental
motives.305 Thus, a wide array of doctrines—including the concept of “lowvalue speech,” the deferential treatment of incidental burdens, and even the
apparent judicial emphasis on the effects of speech regulations—are all in fact
designed to flush out and invalidate regulations that are based on the
government’s desire to suppress speech because it disagrees with, disapproves
of, or is threatened by the ideas espoused by the speaker.306 This doctrinal
sleight of hand—the use of non-purpose-based doctrine to ferret out illicit
purposes—is useful because a candidly purpose-based doctrine would
confront the twin problems of false negatives and false positives: on the one
hand, impermissible governmental motives are notoriously difficult for
litigants to prove, and on the other hand, permissible ones are notoriously easy
for legislatures to feign.307 Kagan uses R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul308 as illustrative
of this indirect doctrinal concern with governmental purpose in the First
Amendment area.309 The Court’s recent Commerce Clause decisions show a
similar legerdemain.
Regan, supra note 301, at 1284-87. Regan goes further and suggests that an inquiry
into purpose (which he calls “motive”) may be generally appropriate in cases testing the outer
limits of governmental authority. See id. at 1144 (“From the point of view of the constitutionwriter, who is attempting to define for herself, in abstraction from particular legislative
problems, what the legislature ought and ought not to be able to do, it turns out that in some
areas motive is precisely the crucial variable.”).
304

305 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 415 (1996).
306

Id. at 428.

307

Id. at 440.

308

505 U.S. 377 (1992).

309 Kagan, supra note 305, at 422 (“[H]alf hidden beneath a swirl of doctrinal
formulations, the crux of the dispute between the majority and the concurring opinions
concerned the proper understanding of St. Paul’s motive in enacting its hate-speech law.”).
Similarly, it has been argued (and the Supreme Court has held on more than one occasion) that
the narrow-tailoring prong of strict judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, which
on its face is more concerned with legislative means than legislative ends, in fact serves to
“smoke out” illegitimate governmental purposes. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1146 (2005).
See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 146 (1980) (“[F]unctionally, special
scrutiny, in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of ‘flushing
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Three objections could be raised to this article’s account of the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as reflecting an underlying concern with
legislative purpose. The first objection is descriptive in character. According
to this objection, the facial cast of the Court’s recent cases is not explained by
some subterranean concern with legislative purpose, but by concepts that
appear on the very surface of the cases themselves: substantial effects,
aggregation, and the idea of the comprehensive regulatory scheme, possibly
complemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Intrastate economic
activities may be regulated by Congress if, when aggregated, they have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce; intrastate non-economic activities
may also be reached if doing so is essential to a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme. The statute at issue in Wickard was upheld because it
satisfied the first of these criteria, the statute in Raich because it satisfied the
second, and the statutes in Lopez and Morrison were struck down because they
satisfied neither. End of story.
My first response to this objection is to demur. At the broadest level, a
primary objective of this article has been to show that the choice between asapplied and facial review turns on the nature and content of the applicable
substantive constitutional doctrine rather than on questions of severability or
the framing of the claimant’s request for relief. If the reader is convinced that
the Court has turned of late to facial review in Commerce Clause cases and
that substantive judicial doctrine is responsible for the turn, then that objective
has been fulfilled. My second and narrower response, however, is to suggest
that the objection is question-begging, and fails to account adequately for the
facial character of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Why did the
fact that the prohibition on intrastate, noncommercial medical marijuana use
was part of a larger regulatory scheme suffice to thwart an as-applied
challenge? More tellingly, why was the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated
on its face, and not merely as applied to Alfonzo Lopez? Even if one accepts
that Congress cannot regulate noncommercial, intrastate activity where the
regulation is not part of a comprehensive scheme, it remains to be explained
why such a regulation should be struck down on its face. Surely, from the
perspective of the values of federalism and judicial restraint, there are sound
reasons for favoring an as-applied approach.310 The answer, I have suggested,
out’ unconstitutional motivation.”); but see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L. J. 427
(1997).
See, e.g., Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This case exemplifies
the role of States as laboratories.”); Vermeule, Perverse Effects, supra note 274; cf. Thomas W.
Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 823 (2005) (criticizing the Court’s use of prohibitory limitations in Commerce Clause
cases and advocating the essentially as-applied mechanism of the clear statement rule).
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is that the Court views Commerce Clause challenges as valid-rule facial
challenges, grounded in the notion that the challenged statute as a whole must
have a permissible regulatory purpose.
The second objection is normative in character. Even if a purposebased account of the Commerce Clause has some descriptive force in
explaining the Court’s recent turn to facial review, the objection runs, such an
understanding is normatively disastrous.311 Putting to one side the practical
problems of proof and comparative institutional competence associated with a
purpose inquiry,312 the reinvigoration of a purpose-based approach to the
Commerce Clause could cast the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Endangered
Species Act, and countless other vital federal regulatory statutes into serious
constitutional doubt.313
This normative objection is serious. Because this article has primarily
descriptive aims, I will address it only briefly here by making three points.
First, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between constitutional
meaning and constitutional doctrine. This article has shown that a controlling
bloc of justices understands the meaning of the Commerce Clause to
incorporate a legislative purpose component, not that the Court’s judicial
doctrine directly incorporates a requirement of legitimate purpose.314 Current
doctrine, which focuses on the nature and effects of the regulated activity, can
accommodate the Civil Rights Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other
landmark federal laws with relative ease.315 Second, even at the level of
See, e.g., Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(warning of the disadvantages of an emphasis on purpose in Commerce Clause review).
311

312

See supra text accompanying notes 279-284.

313 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 939 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“From an early time in our national history, the Federal Government has used its enumerated
powers, such as its power to regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting
public morality… .”); Roosevelt, supra note 298, at 1694 (“[E]ven when regulated activities
clearly did substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress was frequently regulating them
for other reasons—something that, if we take McCulloch’s pretext passage seriously, might be
unconstitutional.”); Litman & Greenberg, supra note 58, at 939-40 (interpreting Heart of Atlanta
Motel and McClung to mean “that the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
particular subjects or areas, regardless of its aims”).
314

Cf. Berman, Gullibility, supra note 296, at 1523-27.

315 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241 (upholding Civil Rights Act); McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (same); GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding
ESA); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062 (same); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002)
(upholding Clean Air Act). But see Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 617 (2005) (presenting questions concerning the scope of the
Commerce Clause with respect to the Clean Water Act).
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meaning, this article does not claim that the Court believes the Commerce
Clause requires the challenged statute to have the sole or primary aim of
regulating interstate commerce, only that it have some reasonably plausible
commercial purpose. Again, statutes such as the Civil Rights Act have no
difficulty satisfying this looser requirement.316 Third, even if Congress’s
interstate commerce power were restricted to enacting statutes with a primarily
commercial purpose, a powerful case can be made that federal civil rights
statutes prohibiting private acts of discrimination are a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.317 This would
of course require the Court to overrule its decision to the contrary in The Civil
Rights Cases,318 but that seems a small price to pay.
The final objection is theoretical in character. The objection runs as
follows: even if Commerce Clause cases call for valid-rule adjudication, such
adjudication could in theory address itself to the validity of “subrules,” i.e.,
applications of a statutory rule to subclasses of activities not textually
differentiated on the face of the challenged statute. Though this kind of
review might be described, formally speaking, as “valid-subrule facial review,”
in practice it would be indistinguishable from as-applied review.319 Such
review is indeed theoretically possible. In fact, one can read the dissents in
Raich and the majority opinions in the Section 5 cases of Lane and Georgia as
calling for just such an approach.320 For present purposes, however, it suffices
to note that the Court does not show any inclination toward such “validsubrule” review in Commerce Clause cases. Indeed, Raich appears to stand for
the proposition that courts should not entertain Commerce Clause challenges
316 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241, and McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (upholding
statutes prohibiting racial and other forms of discrimination in places of public
accommodation on the ground that Congress could rationally conclude that such
discrimination burdens interstate commerce, notwithstanding that Congress’s intent may have
been primarily to address moral ills); Seinfeld, supra note 286, at 1318-19 (observing that the
Civil Rights Act has multiple aims, including promoting interstate commerce by ensuring
nondiscriminatory access to it).

Cf., e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of the Commerce Clause:
Congressional Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1215 (1998) (“It
would be ennobling—even affirming to those who have suffered from discrimination—if the
Supreme Court admitted that we now have a national commitment to equality that does not
countenance discrimination in any corner of the nation. That commitment, not tangential
effects on the economy, explains congressional action to reduce bias.”).
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109 U.S. 3 (1883) (reaffirmed in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-25).

319 Richard Fallon makes a general argument of this kind in response to Matthew
Adler’s claim that constitutional rights are “rights against rules.” See Fallon, As-Applied, supra
note 95, at 1334-35.
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See supra text accompanying notes 266-268.
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to the constitutionality of textually undifferentiated subrules once Congress
has chosen to legislate more broadly. The reason, this article suggests, is that
Commerce Clause doctrine is driven by a concern with legislative purpose, and
judicial inquiry (direct or indirect) into the purpose underlying such
undifferentiated subrules would be difficult at best and incoherent at worst.
CONCLUSION
This article shows that facial challenges have come to predominate in
the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and concludes that the
soundest explanation for this development lies in an understanding of the
meaning of the Clause that incorporates a requirement of permissible
legislative purpose. That conclusion, moreover, illustrates two larger lessons
about contemporary constitutional law.
First, constitutional meaning is not the same as constitutional doctrine.
This article has suggested that in the Commerce Clause area, a conception of
constitutional meaning that includes a requirement of commercial purpose has
driven the Court toward facial adjudication, but this latent concern with
purpose has not (yet) left a substantial imprint on the Court’s doctrine. In
other areas, such as the Equal Protection Clause and Congress’s Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority, the Court has erred by conflating its
decision rules with the Constitution’s operative meaning—in short, it has
treated doctrine as if it were meaning.321 It is more important than ever for
judges and scholars to bear in mind the difference between the two.
Second, there is often no fixed dividing line to be drawn between
substance and procedure in constitutional adjudication. As this article has
shown, the choice between facial and as-applied review is not a mere threshold
matter of procedure or pleading. Rather, it is inextricably bound up with the
nature and functioning of applicable substantive constitutional doctrine. A
similar merger of substance and procedure is visible in many other areas of
constitutional law. To mention a few examples: hardly anyone believes any
longer in a rigid analytic separation between “rights” and “remedies”;322 it is
widely accepted that standing requirements—if they can be understood at all—
cannot be understood in isolation from the issues to be adjudicated on the
merits;323 and the state action requirement, at least in difficult cases, cannot be
deployed as a workable threshold test absent an inquiry into substantive
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See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 298.

322

See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 298.
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See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37.
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constitutional doctrine.324 The doctrine-dependent quality of the choice
between facial and as-applied challenges is just one more instance of the
permeability of the supposed boundary between constitutional substance and
procedure.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1699 (2d ed. 1988)
(“The state action requirement fixes a frame of reference. The substantive constitutional right
at issue initially determines the parameters of this frame.”).
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